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The political' and judicial outcry2 for "reform" of federal habeas
corpus practice has been mirrored in a series of recent Supreme Court
decisions effectively streamlining the process for seeking federal relief from
state court convictions.' Whether the trend toward limiting access to the
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1. The "political outcry" for limiting federal habeas corpus actions, particularly actions brought
by or on behalf of state death-row inmates, is evident in the recent Congressional battles over the
content of a new crime bill. Both the House Bill, H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) and Senate
version, S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), provided for limitations upon access to federal courts
by prisoners challenging state court convictions, as did the House/Senate Conference Committee Bill
which emerged, but stalled in Congress. See H.R. REP. No. 405, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
2. The "judicial outcry" for limitation on recourse to federal courts by inmates convicted in
state trials is apparent in a number of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. For
example, in Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320 (1990), the Court acted to lift a stay of execution granted
pursuant to the filing of a successive federal habeas petition raising no new meritorious claims. Justice
Kennedy concurred and encouraged prosecutors to challenge stays granted in such instances. Similarly,
in Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984), the Court rejected the argument that district courts
are obligated to rule on every "1lth hour" petition for federal habeas relief before denying a stay of
execution (Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring). Clearly, the problem is perceived as most acute in
capital cases in which protracted post-conviction litigation has been utilized as a means of delaying
executions. See Lewis F. Powell, Capital Punishment, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1035, 1039-40 (1989) (noting
"burdensome increase in habeas corpus litigation").
For another perspective on the battle within the Court for changes in the writ, see Marcia Coyle,
Back to the Future: The Justices Re-examine the Habeas Corpus Writ, 14 NAT'L L.J. 1, 52-53 (Feb.
17, 1992).
3. A comprehensive review of the post-conviction litigation process in capital cases was under-
taken by the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's Project on Death Penalty Habeas
Corpus, resulting in a substantial report authored by American University Law Professor Ira Robbins.
The report, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases (1990),
documents failings in the current system of review, particularly in terms of inadequacy of counsel
which complicate the post-conviction relief system.
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federal forum will be advanced legislatively or through decisions further
narrowing the window of hope for state inmates, it appears clear that the
remedy envisioned by some members of the Court and proponents of
limitation4 will alter the significance of federal habeas corpus as a remedy
for constitutional error committed in state criminal trials.'
Review of state convictions in federal habeas actions represents an
important step in the preservation of a federalized system of constitutional
law precisely because it affords an independent forum for vindication of
federally protected rights. 6 The Court's decision in Michigan v. Long7 has
firmly established the principle that federal courts are the ultimate deter-
minors of federal rights violations.8 Thus, state court pronouncements on
issues of federal law are not binding on the Supreme Court or lower
federal courts, but remain subject to review upon application for certiorari
in the context of criminal appeals. 9 Unless Michigan v. Long stands for
nothing more than the proposition that the Court asserted jurisdiction
merely to reign-in zealous state court judges intent upon expanding rights
of criminal defendants beyond bounds contemplated by the Constitution
4. The problem of finality is particularly acute in capital cases after imposition of the death
penalty and has led to much of the criticism of federal habeas corpus as a remedy for state inmates
challenging state court determinations. For example, in his concurring opinion to a per curiam order
denying a stay of execution in Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109 (1983), former Chief Justice
Burger criticized the delay involved in capital cases, commenting that the argument that "capital
punishment is cruel and unusual is dwarfed by the cruelty of 10 years on death row inflicted on this
guilty defendant by lawyers seeking to turn the administration of justice into [a] sporting contest."
Id. at 112.
Of course, had the petitioner disapproved of his counsel's efforts to obtain relief from the death
penalty, he could well have terminated the lengthy appeals process himself, as the decisions in Gilmore
v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1012-15 (1976) and Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-67 (1990)
unequivocally suggest, simply by discharging his attorneys and waiving further litigation. That he did
not do so might suggest Chief Justice Burger's expression of empathy was not shared by the litigant.
Counsel's interest in pursuing every arguable claim for relief may have reflected the "natural" interest
in representing the capital client noted by the Court in Lambert v. Barrett, 159 U.S. 660, 662 (1895).
5. This term, the Court held in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 1993 WL 119795 (U.S., decided April
21, 1993), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), that the proper standard for
reversal of a state court conviction based on a claim of federal constitutional rights violation in a
federal habeas corpus action includes proof that the violation "had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id. at 12. This standard requires the petitioner to carrry
the burden of demonstrating prejudice in order to obtain federal habeas relief. In contrast the
"harmless error" standard applicable to state appellate review of claims of federal constitutional error
set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1967), required reversal unless the error could
be shown to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For further discussion of Brecht and its
potential impact in habeas corpus litigation see notes 80-86, infra, and accompanying text. See also
Robinson v. Virginia, 414 S.E.2d 866, 868 (Va. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 967 (1993)
(cert denied where petitioner sought review of state appellate court's disposition of claim of prophylactic
rule violation based on argument that court below applied higher burden for reversal that Chapman
harmless error standard where state court held improper comment on defendant's post-arrest silence
did not "so infect" trial with unfairness as to constitute denial of due process).
6. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (holding federal habeas available to
review claims based on "disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is
the only effective means of preserving his rights").
7. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
8. Id. at 1041.
9. E.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681-84 (1986) (reversing state court holding
that a violation of the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause was not subject to application of
harmless error analysis).
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itself - as some cynical observers might well suggest - the decision
clearly indicates the importance of both federal and state constitutional
sources of protection for individual rights and liberties.' 0
Federal habeas review of state court dispositions on claims of federal
rights violations remains the most credible means of ensuring that state
courts will properly enforce those protections afforded criminal defendants
by the national Constitution. In fact, federal habeas corpus persists as an
attractive remedy for state inmates precisely because it traditionally has
been a source of relief in so many instances." Curtailment of access to
federal court necessarily means that there will be no alternative forum to
have complaints of state court error heard and, given the frequency of
relief granted, necessarily means as well that many violations of federally
protected rights will never be vindicated by the judicial system at any
level. 12
Recent decisions have served the purpose of the reform movement
well while retaining jurisdiction in federal courts for the correction of state
trial and prosecution errors which infringe on federal constitutional guar-
antees. For example, recent decisions of the Court have clarified the
procedural limitations which are imposed upon federal habeas corpus
applications in a number of significant contexts. State inmates are required
to exhaust remedies in state proceedings, when available, before asserting
these claims in federal actions, even when the federal application contains
some claims which have been "exhausted" through prior litigation in state
court. 3 Similarly, application of a state procedural bar by a state appellate
court precludes federal habeas review of a claimed violation of a federally
protected right. 4 Moreover, a federal habeas court is bound by state fact-
10. The decision rests on the significance attached by state appellate courts to their own sources
of constitutional rights in deciding claims of violation. If the state appellate court relies on the state
constitution as a basis for reversal where the same protection may be discerned in both the state and
federal documents, the reference to this "adequate and independent state ground" insulates the state
court's decision from further review by the Supreme Court. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-
26 (1945) (originally applying "adequate and independent grounds" approach to state decisions in
FELA actions).
11. For example, one study of federal habeas dispositions in state death penalty cases showed
that from July 1976 through March 1991 reversals based upon finding of constitutional error occurred
in 136 of 345 capital judgments reviewed by federal courts. The reversal rate among all circuits
averaged 39%, while reversal rates in the two most active circuits, the 5th and l1th, stood at 28%
and 50%, respectively. Liebman, Memorandum to Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman, Senate Judiciary
Committee, July 1, 1991, at 1-3 (copy on file with UMKC Law Review). Similarly, in dissenting in
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) Justice Marshall noted his opposition to expedited federal
review in capital cases due to the high rate of success achieved by death row inmates in setting aside
their sentences.
12. Criminal defendants retain the option of petitioning for review in the United States Supreme
Court from an adverse decision of the highest court of a state on an issue of federal constitutional
law, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1988). Defendants, moreover, continue to gain relief from
adverse state court determinations on cert following direct appeal. See, e.g., Trevino v. Texas, 112 S.
Ct. 1547, 1550 (1992) (defendant in pre-Batson [Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)] trial properly
preserved Batson issue for consideration on appeal and is entitled to benefit of rule announced therein);
Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992) (per curiam reversal of capital sentence based on sentencer's
consideration of invalid aggravating circumstance).
13. E.g. Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984) (applying exhaustion requirement in
context of capital cases).
14. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553-54 (1991) (overruling "deliberate bypass"
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finding on an issue previously litigated, so that defective litigation of
factual issues will not afford a basis for a new evidentiary hearing at the
federal level, according to the Court's recent holding in Keeney v. Tamayo-
Reyes. 15
Finally, in McCleskey v. Zant,16 the Court effectively held that a
successive federal habeas petition could only be considered if the claim of
rights violation was accompanied by a showing of the petitioner's factual
innocence. 1
Even a cursory review of the procedural reforms of the habeas corpus
process implemented by the Court in its recent decisions demonstrates that
many of the abuses traditionally associated with the writ have now been
addressed. The state court defendant continues to enjoy the option of
petitioning for relief from his state court conviction on federal constitu-
tional grounds, but with limitations that would appear reasonable in the
majority of cases: the inmate is essentially entitled to a single action, in
which the federal court will consider only those claims which have been
properly preserved in the state courts and upon which state avenues for
relief have been fully litigated and exhausted.
The primary difficulty with imposing this procedurally refined and
altogether more expeditious approach to post-conviction relief lies in the
fact that at the same time as the Court sought to refine the remedy, it
denied to indigent inmate litigants the right to effective assistance of
counsel for post-conviction litigation. 8 Consequently, while imposing new
conditions on the proper exercise of the statutory right to seek federal
review, the Court has denied to many litigants the assistance of counsel
as a matter of right - in theory the most significant factor in ensuring
compliance with procedural rules. 9
As in past years, the current term of the Supreme Court poses new
concerns for the vitality of federal habeas corpus with regard to issues
which may be resolved adversely to proponents of the writ as a means of
standard of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) and holding that state procedural default in presentation
of claim of federal rights violation precludes federal review in habeas corpus action).
15. 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1721 (1992) (applying cause and prejudice standard as threshold for
evidentiary hearing in federal habeas action unless fundamental miscarriage of justice would result
from the failure to hold a hearing).
16. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). McCleskey's prior petition to the United States Supreme Court had
been granted and was the subject of a major decision holding that a statistical showing of apparent
racial disparity in application of the death sentence was not sufficient to invalidate Georgia's capital
sentencing procedures. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
17. 111 S. Ct. at 1475. ("McCleskey cannot demonstrate that the alleged Massiah [Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)] violation caused the conviction of an innocent person.").
18. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 553-59 (1987) (no constitutional right to post-conviction
assistance of counsel even though counsel may be provided by state statute or rule); Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3-9 (1989) (no constitutional right to assistance of counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings in death penalty cases).
19. Of course, assistance of counsel does not ensure compliance with procedural rules, and where
counsel's error deprives the accused of direct appellate review, this error provides a basis for relief.
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). But where the error on counsel's part is committed in the context
of post-conviction representation, the lack of a constitutional guarantee of counsel has been held in
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2560-68 (1991), to preclude relief because the lack of the
basic right precludes any claim to effectiveness in counsel's assistance.
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checking state court power in the disposition of claims of federal rights
violations. The potentially most significant case, Herrera v. Collins,20
presented the issue of whether a claim of the petitioner's actual innocence,
standing alone, represents a "substantial claim for relief" cognizable in
federal habeas corpus. 2'
The Court's movement toward a more restrictive view of the writ as
a means for collateral attack upon state court judgments threatens the
vitality of the criminal justice system in three significant respects. It
threatens the federalized notion of civil rights relied on by the Court in
Michigan v. Long; it imposes unfair burdens on defense counsel; and the
posture taken by the Court in Herrera may threaten the integrity of the
criminal justice system.
I. THE COST TO FEDERALISM
In Michigan v. Long,22 the Court reiterated the existence of a dual
series of constitutional guarantees or protections of individual rights and
liberties found in the federal and state constitutions. 2 The Court noted
that the primary vehicle for enforcement of federally protected rights of
criminal defendants rests with state courts in state criminal prosecutions. 24
20. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). For a detailed discussion of the Court's decision in Herrera, see Part
III, infra.
21. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Herrera's 'actual innocence'
claim does not allege a ground upon which habeas relief can be granted."). Id. at 1034.
22. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Earlier decisions had dealt with the problem posed by state court
reliance on expressions of state law in determining the precise basis for a state appellate court judgment.
E.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 651-52 (1979) (Delaware Supreme Court held stop violated
Fourth Amendment and comparable provision of state constitution; nevertheless, Supreme Court
concluded that while the state ground might have been adequate, the state court did not intend to rest
decision on state constitution independent of federal provision); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719-
20 (1975) (concluding Oregon court relied on federal precedent in determining admissibility of confession
because no sources of state law cited in opinion); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1982)
(declining to find state decision rested on adequate and independent state ground; state decision relied
on earlier precedent interpreting federal constitutional provisions).
23. The Long Court noted:
We believe that such an approach will provide state judges with a clearer opportunity to
develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, and yet will preserve the
integrity of federal law. "It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by
us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or
obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this
Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action."
463 U.S. at 1041 (quoting Minnesota v. National Tea Company, 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)).
24. The majority observed:
The state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigation in this country. In 1982, more
than 12 million criminal actions (excluding juvenile and traffic charges) were filed in the 50
state court systems and the District of Columbia. 7 State Court Journal, No. 1, p. 18 (1983).
By comparison, approximately 32,700 criminal suits were filed in federal courts during that
same year. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts 6 (1982). The state courts are required to apply federal constitutional standards,
and they necessarily create a considerable body of 'federal law' in the process. It is not
surprising that this Court has become more interested in the application and development
of federal law by state courts in light of the recent significant expansion of federally created
standards we have imposed on the States.
463 U.S. at 1042 n.8.
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Where state courts decide questions arising under both federal and state
constitutions, but do so on a basis that relies on state constitutional
interpretation and authority, the Court indicated that it would be deprived
of jurisdiction to invade the decision-making process. 25 Where a state court
decision rests on its understanding of the commands of the federal con-
stitution, the Court asserted presumptive jurisdiction to review the decision
and impose its own understanding of federal guarantees. 26
Critics of the Court's holding in Long might well suggest that the
decision represents less a. reasoned approach to differentiating between
application of limited federal constitutional protections - and more ex-
pansive views of individual rights and liberties discerned from comparable
state constitutional guarantees 27 - than a vehicle for intimidating state
court judges in their resolution of constitutional claims of rights viola-
tions.
28
Indeed, the Court's assertion of a presumptive right to review state
court determinations in the absence of a "plain statement" of an adequate
and independent state ground for relief 29 suggests that the Long majority's
25. Id. at 1041 ("If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively
based on bona fide, separate, adequate and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake
to review the decision.") (emphasis added).
26. 463 U.S. at 1040-41. The majority concluded:
[W]hen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal
law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as
the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because
it believed that federal law required it to do so.
Id. The Court declined to remand Long for further explanation from the Michigan Supreme Court as
to its reliance on the state constitution as a basis for decision, relying on Oregon v. Kennedy, 456
U.S. 667, 670-71 (1982) (state court's reliance on federal constitution as basis for decision requires
Supreme Court to address issue on the merits).
27. The consequence of restriction of federal constitutional guarantees over the past twenty years
in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court has been an active development of state
constitutional law by state appellate courts. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State
Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 972-74 (1982) (selected bibliography of writings on state constitutional law);
Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger
Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Alexander Williams, Jr., The New Patrol for the Accused: State
Constitutions as a Buffer Against Retrenchment, 26 How. L.J. 1307, 1332-34 (1983). A leading
proponent of the movement toward activist state appellate appreciation of state constitutional guarantees
has been former Associate Justice William Brennan, who made an important contribution with his
article, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977),
while still a member of the Court.
28. See Stevens, J., dissenting in Long:
I am thoroughly baffled by the Court's suggestion that it must stretch its jurisdiction and
reverse the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court in order to show "[riespect for the
independence of state courts." . . . Would we show respect for the Republic of Finland by
convening a special sitting for the sole purpose of declaring that its decision to release an
American citizen was based upon a misunderstanding of American law?
463 U.S. at 1072 (citation omitted). He noted that apart from numerous state court decisions already
considered by the Court on application for review by the states themselves, some eighty more cert
petitions filed by the states were pending disposition at the time of the decision in Long. Id. at 1070
29. 463 U.S. at 1042.
296
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underlying motivation was to justify an expansive notion of jurisdiction
in reviewing state court judgments, a0 a posture criticized by Justice Black-
mun in his concurring opinion.3' This presumptive right of review effec-
tively restrains only those state courts viewing federal constitutional
protections as more expansive or generous toward criminal defendants
than the more conservative Supreme Court. The problem posed for this
federal duality of constitutional protections by recent decisions of the
Supreme Court limiting habeas review lies in the consequent insulation of
state court decision-making in the area of federal rights.3 2 Clearly, Long
demonstrates that the Supreme Court retains paramount interest in ensuring
that state court interpretations of federal constitutional guarantees are
consistent with its own view of the boundaries of the protections afforded
by the federal constitution. But limitation on access to federal habeas
courts threatens to undermine the balance which must exist to ensure that
state courts will also accurately enforce existing parameters of federal
guarantees, as determined by the Supreme Court.
The corollary to the rule of presumptive right of review by the Supreme
Court was advanced by the Court in Ylst v. Nunnemaker.3 There, the
Court reversed a Ninth Circuit holding which rested on a presumption
that denial of state habeas relief as to a federal ground of error without
explicit reliance on state law grounds constitutes a rejection of the federal
claim, affording a basis for review on federal habeas.3 4 The Supreme
Court, in rejecting the Ninth Circuit's decision, concluded that the ambig-
uous denial of relief by the California Supreme Court required reference
to the last appellate expression of rationale for denied relief, a decision
of the California Court of Appeals barring relief based on state procedural
default.35 Thus, the rule of Harris v. Reed, permitting application of the
presumption of reviewability of the federal claim,3 6 is limited to those cases
in which the disposition of the federal claim on its merits, regardless of
the possible application of a state procedural default rule, is apparent in
the decision of the state court.3 7 Consequently, regardless of the merits of
a federal claim or its attractiveness, the legacy of Long does not reach to
30. Id. & n.8.
31. 463 U.S. at 1054. ("While I am satisfied that the Court has jurisdiction in this particular
case, I do not join the Court . . . in fashioning a new presumption of jurisdiction over cases coming
here from state courts.").
32. The Court's general position has crystallized: "Reexamination of state conviction on federal
habeas corpus 'frustrate[s] . . . both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-
faith attempts to honor constitutional rights."' Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986) (quoting
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)). "Our federal system recognizes the independent power of
a State to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of a State to pass laws means
little if the State cannot enforce them." McCleskey v. Zant, III S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991).
33. 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991).
34. Id. at 2594 & n.2.
35. Id. at 2596.
36. 489 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1989).
37. 111 S. Ct. at 2593 ("If the last state court to be presented with a particular federal claim
reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal courtreview that might otherwise have been available.")
(citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989).
1992l
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presumptively afford review when a state court decision does not purport
to reach the merits of the federal claim based on application of a rule of
state procedural default, and ambiguity in this context does not weigh in
favor of federal review.
The xiecision in Long itself necessarily demonstrates that some further
check on state court decision-making is essential to producing a correct
and consistent national view of federal guarantees. Nevertheless, two
potentially significant thrusts in the movement for further "reform" of
federal habeas corpus threaten its continuing viability as a means of
ensuring application of federally protected rights in state court proceedings.
A. The Issue of Deference to State Court Findings of Law
Federal habeas deference to state court fact finding is mandated by
the statute defining the scope of the federal writ.18 In Tamayo-Reyes, the
Court this past term restricted the scope of right to an evidentiary hearing
in the federal habeas court if an evidentiary hearing had previously resulted
in fact-finding at the state level.39 Despite the spirited argument between
the majority and dissenting justices4° the impact of the rule announced in
Tamayo-Reyes, that a federal petitioner burdened with an inadequately
developed factual record in state court will now have to demonstrate cause
for the default and actual prejudice resulting from the failure, may
practically be limited, as Justice Kennedy observed in his dissent.4 1
A greater threat to the continued vitality of the federal writ as a
means of ensuring compliance with federally protected guarantees in state
criminal trials is suggested by this past term's most critical habeas corpus
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988) provides that state fact findings "shall be presumed to be correct"
unless the petitioner can bring the case within a statutorily-defined exception that justifies further fact-
finding.
39. Tamayo-Reyes v. Keeney, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1721 (1992) (applying "cause and prejudice" test
to claim of defective fact-finding at state court level warranting additional evidentiary hearing in the
federal habeas court).
40. See 112 S. Ct. at 1721 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Stevens and Kennedy);
d. at 1727 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that the petitioner's contention, if
factually true, would require relief and argued that the majority disregarded the clear legislative intent
of Congress in enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), incorporating the prior decision of the Court in Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). In Townsend, the Court had concluded that where facts necessary for
a resolution of a claim cognizable on federal habeas had not been fully developed in state court
proceedings, an evidentiary hea-ing in the habeas court was appropriate unless the petitioner had
deliberately bypassed orderly state court procedure. Id. at 317. The majority in Tamayo-Reyes voted
to overrule the Townsend v. Sain use of the "deliberate bypass" standard as necessarily inconsistent
with other recent habeas corpus decisions restricting access to federal relief in order to properly balance
federal and state interests in the criminal justice system. 112 S. Ct. at 1718-19. In dissenting, Justice
O'Connor stressed: "In my view, the balance of state and federal interests regarding whether a federal
court will consider a claim raised on habeas cannot be simply lifted and transposed to the different
question whether, once the court will consider the claim, it should hold an evidentiary hearing." Id.
at 1721.
41. 112 S. Ct. at 1727. Justice Kennedy noted that typically the development of a factual record,
regardless of adequacy, may have little impact on the disposition of the federal claim, while observing
that there was little evidence that cases falling within the ambit of Townsend v. Sain have not been
significant in terms of "burden[ing] the dockets of the federal courts." Id.
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case, Wright v. West. 42 The case involved review of a conviction obtained
pursuant to application of the permissive inference that exclusive and
inadequately explained possession of recently stolen property is sufficient
for proof of theft. The trial court had properly instructed the jury that
the inference was permissible and that the State was nevertheless bound
to prove the defendant's guilt by establishing every element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. 41
The Fourth Circuit, reviewing the conviction and denial of habeas
relief by the district court, concluded that the evidence adduced was
insufficient to support conviction under the standards of proof and review
announced in Jackson v. Virginia.4 In agreeing to review the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion, the Court expressly directed the parties to brief a
question not raised in the petition for writ of certiorari:
In determining whether to grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, should
a federal court give deference to the state court's application of law to
the specific facts of the petitioner's case or should it review the state
court's determination de novo?45
The Court's directive suggested that not only might deference to state fact-
finding, already a matter of statutory and judicial affirmation, be binding
on federal habeas corpus, but that state determinations of law might
similarly prove controlling in subsequent federal litigation. 4 Justice Thomas,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, observed that while the
Court had rejected a position of absolute deference to prior state court
determinations in federal habeas litigation in Brown v. Allen,47 Justice
Frankfurter had written an "influential separate opinion"8 in Brown,
noting that the state court opinion might serve to guide a federal habeas
court in making its decision. 49
Justice Thomas ultimately declined to consider the merits of the issue
the Court had specifically requested the parties to brief and argue, concluding
that under either a deferential or de novo standard of review, the Fourth
Circuit erred in finding the evidence insufficient to support conviction. 0
42. 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992), rev'g West v. Wright, 931 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1991).
43. 112 S. Ct. at 2485 n.2 (applying the rule of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
44. 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (evidence sufficient to support conviction if "after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt").
45. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 672, 672 (1991). The order granting the writ was issued two days
earlier, on December 16, 1991. 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991). Justices Blackmun and Stevens, while not
dissenting from the order granting the writ, did dissent from the December 18, 1991, order for briefing
of this issue.
46. In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953) the Court rejected the position that a state
court determination is not binding on a federal habeas court as to constitutional claims, even if the
issue has been fully and fairly litigated in state court.
47. 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).
48. Wright, 112 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
49. Brown, 344 U.S. at 506-508.
50. Wright, 112 S. Ct. at 2492 ("[Tlhe claim advanced by the habeas petitioner must fail even
assuming that the state court's rejection of it should be reconsidered de novo. Whatever the appropriate
standard of review, we conclude that there was more than enough evidence to support West's
conviction.").
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However, he clearly iterated the position that Brown v. Allen does not
foreclose application of a deferential standard of review," apparently
relying on Justice Frankfurter's observation in his concurring opinion that
"there is no need for the federal judge, if he could, to shut his eyes to
the State consideration" of the mixed question of fact and law.52
In finding support for application of a standard of deferential review,
rather than de novo review, Justice Thomas finds Frankfurter's rejection
of the principle of absolute deference less probative of the meaning of
Brown v. Allen than the majority's requirement that the habeas court
decide whether the state court determination resulted in a "satisfactory
conclusion." 53 The question posed and not answered by Justice Thomas is
whether this term might simply be construed to require that the habeas
court defer to a state court judgment which is "reasonable," as opposed
to "correct.
'5 4
Justice White concurred in the judgment, specifically finding the
evidence sufficient to support conviction, and did not discuss the standard
of review issue at all.55 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens, argued at length with Justice Thomas's historical analysis,5 6
concluding that consideration of the state court opinion does not require
deference in decision-making, and finally asserting unequivocally: "We
have always held that federal courts, even on habeas have an independent
obligation to say what the law is."" Justice Kennedy wrote separately5" to
reaffirm his support for the principle of de novo review of mixed questions
of law and fact arising in the context of a constitutional claim, as expressly
relied upon by the Court in Miller v. Fenton.5 9
51. 112 S. Ct. at 2488 n.5 ("[W]e conclude not that Brown v. Allen establishes deferential review
for reasonableness, but only that Brown does not squarely foreclose it.").
52. Brown, 344 U.S. at 508.
53. Id. at 463.
54. Wright, 112 S. Ct. at 2489 n.7.
55. Id. at 2493.
56. Id. at 2493-98.
57. Id. at 2497.
58. Id. at 2498. Justice Kennedy observed:
On these premises, the existence of Teague [Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), limiting
retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure] provides added
justification for retaining de nova review, not a reason to abandon it. Teague gives substantial
assurance that habeas proceedings will not use a new rule to upset a state conviction that
conforms to rules then existing. With this safeguard in place, recognizing the importance of
finality, de novo review can be exercised within its proper sphere.
Id. at 2500. Nevertheless, at least one scholar has concluded that Justice Kennedy's opinion does not
address the issue of de novo review in habeas proceedings. See Joseph L. Hoffman, Starting from
Scratch: Rethinking Federal Habeas Review of Death Penalty Cases, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 133, 153
n.90 (1992).
59. 474 U.S. 104 (1985). In Miller, the Court held that the issue of admissibility of a confession
in a state trial over objection of constitutional violation in its taking created a mixed question of law
and fact requiring application of a standard of de novo review by a federal court considering the
propriety of the state trial court's action in admitting the confession. The Miller Court held, as Justice
O'Connor noted in her opinion in Wright, 112 S. Ct. at 2496, that "an unbroken line of cases,
coming to this Court both on direct appeal and on review of applications to lower federal courts for
a writ of habeas corpus, forecloses the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the 'voluntariness' of a
confession merits something less than independent federal consideration." 474 U.S. at 112.
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Finally, Justice Souter, declining to spar on the question of the
standard of review, 60 relied on the "new rule" principle of Teague v.
Lane,61 to conclude that the petitioner could not rely on the principle set
forth in Jackson v. Virginia governing sufficiency of the evidence in support
of his claim for relief. He found that West's theory of attack was not
clearly dictated by the holding in Jackson, even though that decision
predated finality of his conviction in 1980.62 Thus, for Justice Souter,
disposition was required by application of the strict "new rule" policy of
Teague, even.though he admitted that the Virginia Supreme Court was
bound by Jackson and its standard of proof and review in considering
West's claims. 63 Since Justice Souter then reviewed the evidence and found
conviction justified under the Jackson standard," the predictive value of
his discussion of Jackson and Teague is uncertain. 65
The clear division in the current Court appears to favor eventual
rejection of deferential review in favor of de novo review of constitutional
questions, assuming the issue resurfaces. But the Court's own interest in
having the issue expressly briefed and argued by the parties suggests that
this will be a question of continuing interest." Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
Blackmun and Stevens appear committed to the principle of de novo
review, while Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Scalia, remain open to the idea of adopting a deferential standard of
review in federal habeas actions. Justices White and Souter remain
60. 112 S. Ct. at 2500 n. 1 ("Because my analysis ends the case for me without reaching historical
questions, I do not take a position in the disagreement between Justice Thomas and Justice O'Connor.").
61. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
62. 112 S. Ct. at 2502. The Court of Appeals had concluded that West could benefit from the
holding in Jackson, apparently generalizing that West's attack on the unexplained possession presumption
fell within the ambit of Jackson's command regarding the appropriate burden of proof. West v.
Wright, 931 F.2d 262, 265-67 (4th Cir. 1991). The court below had then relied on another unexplained
possession presumption case, Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373 (lth Cir. 1982), in arriving at its
conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to justify conviction predicated on reliance on the
presumption where additional factors weighing in favor of a finding of guilt were not demonstrated
on the facts adduced at West's state trial. 931 F.2d at 269-70. For Justice Souter, reliance on Jackson
did not contemplate reliance on the far more specific formulation advanced by the Cosby Court. 112
S. Ct. at 2502-03. Moreover, he found the evidence sufficient when applying the Jackson standard to
support conviction, particularly when viewed as supportive of the jury's prior determination. Id. at
2503 & n.3 (reiterating standard of review requiring evidence to be reviewed "in the light most
favorable to the prosecution" (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319)).
63. 112 S. Ct. at 2503 ("There can of course be no doubt that, in reviewing West's conviction,
the Supreme Court of Virginia was not entitled to disregard Jackson, which antedated the finality of
West's conviction.").
64. Id.
65. In fact, Justice Souter reached the merits of the issue under Jackson even after expressly
stating that the issue was properly foreclosed by application of Teague, and that having reached that
posture, he "would go no further." 112 S. Ct. at 2500.
66. In fact, the issue of deference to state determination of federal claims in federal habeas
actions was presented to the Court again this term in Withrow v. Williams, 1993 WL 119753 (U.S.,
decided April 21, 1993). The Court declined to address the issue, despite preservation in the court of
Appeals, see Williams v. Withrow, 944 F.2d 284, 288 (6th Cir. 1991), limiting its consideraton instead
to the issue of preclusion of Miranda-based claims-from federal habeas review. 1993 WL 119753, at
3, n.2. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote separately to argue for the same type of
deference to state court determination of law on questions of federal rights violations that Justice
Thomas had suggested in his opinion in Wright. Id. at 21-25.
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uncommitted on this issue, as both reached their conclusions in Wright v.
West on alternative theories of disposition that did not compel them to
even discuss the question of standard of review.
For federal litigants, the ultimate disposition of this question may
prove critical because a deferential standard of review, as suggested by
Justice Thomas, would appear to permit acceptance of state court reasoning
as seemingly co-equal with that which might be employed by the federal
habeas court in reviewing the claim of constitutional violation. 67 Thus, a
"reasonable" decision rendered by the state court would be entitled to
deference, and might well prove dispositive in this sense, even though the
habeas court were of the opinion that the state decision, while "reasonable,"
was nevertheless incorrect. Justice Kennedy specifically rejected this notion
in his concurring opinion, while recognizing the inherent value of the
principle of comity: "The comity interest is not, however, in saying that
since the question is close the state court decision ought to be deemed
correct because we are in no better position to judge. That would be the
real thrust of a principle based on deference." 6
The integrity of the federalized system of rights noted in Michigan v.
Long demands continued federal de novo review to ensure that federal
protections are properly afforded state court defendants. 69
B. Further Limitation on Review by Subject of Claim
A second potential source of "reform" of federal habeas corpus lies
in limitation upon a particular class of federal claims not subject to review
by habeas corpus once fully and fairly litigated in state proceedings. This
type of limitation is characterized by the Court's decision in Stone v.
Powell,70 which effectively precludes re-litigation of Fourth Amendment
search and seizure claims once the accused has been afforded a "full and
fair" hearing on those claims by state trial courts. 71 Withdrawal of any
67. Justice O'Connor clearly rejected this approach, while conceding that state court opinions
could be of value for a federal habeas court analyzing an issue:
A state court opinion concerning the legal implications of precisely the same set of facts is
the closest one can get to a "case on point," and is especially valuable for that reason. But
this does not mean that we have held in the past that federal courts must presume the
correctness of a state court's legal conclusions on habeas, or that a state court's incorrect
legal determination has ever been allowed to stand because it was reasonable. We have
always held that federal courts, even on habeas, have an independent obligation to say what
the law is.
Wright, 112 S. Ct. at 2497 (emphasis added).
68. 112 S. Ct. at 2499. He then observed that this posture is exactly that required for deference
to state fact-finding in the habeas context. Id.
69. That a "federalized" system of individual rights is consonant with continuing federal review
of state court disposition of constitutional claims is perhaps best reflected in the position of Justice
O'Connor, who authored the majority opinion in Michigan v. Long and a strong defense of de novo
review in federal habeas actions in Wright v. West.
70. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
71. Id. at 481-82. The decision in Stone did not totally foreclose federal review, of course,
because significant questions of Fourth Amendment protection of privacy are still subject to litigation
through application for the writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court to review final
disposition of these claims by State appellate courts. What is apparent is that in the aftermath of
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additional category of federal constitutional claims from federal review
through habeas corpus 2 suggests an entirely unjustified overreaction in
light of the underlying purpose of the remedy, 73 vindication of federally
protected rights that serve to ensure fair trials in state courts.
This term, the Court rejected an effort to bring Miranda-based claims
of federal rights violations within the rule of preclusion announced in
Stone v. Powell. In Withrow v. Williams, 74 Justice Souter wrote for five
members of the Court in distinguishing the interests requiring protection
under Miranda which differ from those justifying preclusion of Fourth
Amendment exclusion of evidence issues in Stone v. Powell. Essentially,
these interests are not primarily concerned with the deterrence of future
police misconduct, as is the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence
Stone most Fourth Amendment questions ultimately resulting in resolution by the Supreme Court have
been brought by prosecutors challenging the reasoning of state courts in ordering suppression of
evidence determined to have been illegally seized. E.g., Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991)
(upholding police request for consent to search luggage of passengers on bus on ground no seizure
had occurred); California v. Acevedo, III S. Ct. 1982 (1991) (police may search unopened container
found in vehicle); California v. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (fleeing suspect not seized until caught
and property disposed of by suspect not product of seizure, but abandoned); Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints conducted pursuant to articulated standard
upheld); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (inadvertence not required for valid seizure under
plain view doctrine); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (anonymous tip corroborated by
observation of details sufficient to justify stop); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Maryland
v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (officers may search areas of home of arrested suspect to extent necessary
to protect against sudden attack); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (helicopter observation of
defendant's property did not result in unconstitutional invasion of privacy); Michigan v. Chesternut,
486 U.S. 567 (1988) (suspect fleeing from police, who have taken no action to stop or arrest, not
seized when he disposes of cocaine within view of officers); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
(1988) (no expectation of privacy in opaque, plastic garbage bags left for pickup outside curtilage of
home); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (good faith exception to exclusionary rule extended to
officers acting pursuant to state statute subsequently declared unconstitutional); Maryland v. Garrison,
480 U.S. 79 (1987) (reasonable belief in accuracy of address by officers obtaining search warrant based
on inaccurate description excuses error and suppression of evidence not required); Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367 (1987) (inventory search of closed container in impounded auto did not violate Fourth
Amendment); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (motor home being used for travel is subject
to automobile exceptions to warrant requirement); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (consent
to search not rendered invalid because suspect not advised he could refuse); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 981 (1984) (mistake by officers obtaining search warrant does not compel suppression);
Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984) (right to search automobile stopped on highway continues
despite impoundment); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (search of suspect's shoulder bag as
inventory pursuant to arrest upheld); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (applying "totality of
circumstances" test in determining lawfulness of search and seizure); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981) (valid arrest of persons that were recently in vehicle affords grounds for search of passenger
compartment); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search of auto impounded
for traffic infraction proper to protect owner's property).
72. Federal habeas corpus petitioners challenging state court convictions proceed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). Although the remedy is statutory in nature, the Court's jurisdiction to remove
violations of prophylactic rules imposed upon state procedure by the Court itself from the ambit of
federal habeas review has not drawn legislative reaction. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363,
1374-75 (7th Cir. 1991); off'd, 1993 WL 119795 (U.S., decided April 21, 1993).
73. For example, in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 205-14 (1989), Justice O'Connor, joined
by Justice Scalia, argued that the rationale of Stone v. Powell should be extended to preclude recourse
to federal habeas corpus for state defendants seeking suppression of "probative evidence" obtained
in violation of the prophylactic rule announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74. 1993 WL 119753 (U.S., decided April 21, 1993), aff'g 944 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1991).
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seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 75 but are concerned with
the vindication of the important constitutional privilege against self-incrim-
ination. 76 Of course, exclusion of illegally seized evidence typically does
not address the question of guilt or innocence directly. Indeed, most
supression motions involve possessory or evidentiary issues where the actual
guilt of the accused is not in serious question. Rather, the possession of
the contraband or item of evidence is probative precisely because the
defendant is factually guilty.77.
In contrast, the concern originally giving rise to prophylactic rules
regarding police interrogation arose from the perception that coerced
confessions compromised the integrity,78 though not necessarily the relia-
bility,79 of the fact-finding process. Nevertheless, a critical feature of
coerced confessions is the inherent likelihood that some suspects will confess
untruthfully, admitting culpability when none actually exists, simply to be
freed of the physical or psychological coercion applied by their interro-
gators. 80
75. Id. at 7. The majority observed that application of the exclusionary rule "can do nothing
to remedy the completed and wholly extrajudicial Fourth Amendment violation" because the illegal
search or seizure has already occurred, citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 486.
76. Withrow, at 5-7. Exclusion of evidence seized in violation of Miranda is necessary because
the assertion of the privilege is "a fundamental trial right" and because this trial right serves to ensure
"correct ascertainment of guilt." Id. at 7.
77. This is a simplistic generalization, of course. For example, even when the question of
possession of contraband forms the basis for prosecution, an accused objecting to an illegal search of
the evidence might still have ample grounds for acquittal since he may not have been in either actual
or joint possession of the contraband while having a valid claim that police acted illegally in seizing
the substance. Similarly, seizure of a weapon or instrument used in the commission of a non-possessory
crime, such as homicide, does not necessarily indicate that the accused objecting to the basis for the
search is either factually or legally guilty. Nevertheless, as an imperfect generalization, Fourth
Amendment violations typically do not involve litigation of claims of innocence, but focus instead on
the protection of privacy interests of the person searched.
78. Fear that the Court is relaxing its traditional concern about police interrogation practices
and the implications for the integrity of the criminal justice system - a posture which traditionally
rendered the admission of a coerced confession at trial beyond harmless error analysis, Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) - may be traced to its more recent decision in Arizona v. Fulminante,
II S. Ct. 1246 (1991), effectively holding that trial error in admitting a coerced confession may be
subjected to harmless error analysis, applying the reasonable doubt standard in determining whether
the confession contributed to the conviction.
79. Thus, in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964), the Court observed that the federal
constitutional principle involved in excluding involuntary confessions rests on the impropriety in
comprising the right not to give testimony against oneself, rather than specifically on a concern that
an involuntarily induced confession might not be truthful in its admission of culpability.
80. The concern for the use of coerced confessions from criminal suspects did not magically
arise during the tenure of former Chief Justice Earl Warren, as Justice Souter impliedly noted in
tracing the court's long-held concern with coerced confessions. Withrow at 5. The classic case of
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), decided by a unanimous Court through then-Chief Justice
Hughes, illustrates the long history of concern over the use of improper police procedures in procuring
convictions of dubious accuracy. There, the record illustrated the police misconduct in unequivocal
terms:
The crime with which these defendants, all ignorant negroes, are charged, was discovered
about one o'clock p.m. on Friday, March 30, 1934. On that night one Dial, a deputy
sheriff, accompanied by others, came to the home of Ellington, one of the defendants, and
requested him to accompany them to the house of the deceased, and there a number of
white men were gathered, who began to accuse the defendant of the crime. Upon his denial
they seized him, and with the participation of the deputy they hanged him by a rope to the
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Apart from total preclusion of a class of claims, such as those raising
violations of the prophylactic rule of Miranda, modification of the standard
of review or burden of proof on federal claims in habeas corpus may have
the most impact on the system of enforcement of federal constitutionally
protected rights. This term, in Brecht v. Abrahamson,8 a majority of the
Supreme Court concluded that the standard for reversal of state court
convictions in federal habeas should be substanitally higher than on direct
review of convictions in state appellate courts. Prior to Brecht, the "harm-
less error" standard of Chapman v. California2 governed disposition of
federal habeas claims. This standard requires reversal of state convictions
upon a showing of a violation of federal constitutionally protected rights
unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when examined
in light of the totality of the record of proceedings below.83 The Brecht
majority concluded that in a federal habeas action, a petitioner complaining
of a state court conviction must demonstrate not only the existence of the
violation of a right protected by the federal constitution, but that the
violation "had substantial and injurious effect 6r influence in determining
the jury's verdict. '84
The Seventh Circuit had predicated its reliance of a standard incor-
porating proof of prejudice or harm in the advancement of the federal
claim in habeas corpus on the fact that the issue in Brecht involved a
violation of a prophylactic rule: an impermissible prosecutorial comment
on the accused's post-arrest silence.85 This comment infringes on the
accused's right to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege in remaining
limb of a tree, and having let him down, they hung him again, and when he was let down
the second time, and he still protested his innocence, he was tied to a tree and whipped,
and still declining to accede to the demands that he confess, he was finally released and
returned with some difficulty to his home,, suffering intense pain and agony .... A day or
two thereafter the said deputy, accompanied by another, returned to the home of the said
defendant and arrested him, and departed with the prisoner towards the jail in an adjoining
county, but went by a route which led into the State of Alabama; and while on the way,
in that State, the deputy stopped and again severely whipped the defendant, declaring that
he would continue the whipping until he confessed, and the defendant then agreed to confess
to such a statement as the deputy would dictate, and he did so, after which he was delivered
to jail.
297 U.S. at 281-82 (quoting Brown v. State, 158 So. 339, 343-44 (Miss. 1935) (Anderson, J., dissenting)).
Two other defendants, Brown and Shields, confessed in a similar manner:
On Sunday night, April 1, 1934, the said deputy, accompanied by a number of white men,
one of whom was also an officer, and by the jailer, came to the jail, and the two last
named defendants were made to strip and they were laid over chairs and their backs were
cut to pieces with a-leather strap with buckles on it, and they were likewise made by the
same deputy definitely to understand that the whipping would be continued unless and until
they confessed, and not only confessed, but confessed in every matter of detail as demanded
by those present; and in this manner the defendants confessed the crime, and as the
whippings progressed and were repeated, they changed or adjusted their confession in all
particulars of detail so as to conform to the demands of their torturers.
Id. at 282. At trial, Deputy Dial admitted the beatings, as did other witnesses and participants in the
beatings. Id. at 284-85.
81. 1993 WL 199795 (U.S., decided April 21, 1993), aff'g 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991).
82. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
83. Id. at 24.
84. Brecht, at 12, approving of formulation applied by the Seventh Circuit in its opinion, 944
F.2d at 1370-74, and following Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 70, 776 (1946).
85. 944 F.2d at 1370-74.
19921
UMKC LA W REVIEW
silent, if he has previously been warned of his Miranda rights, because the
court must presume that his silence reflects an innovation of the privilege,
following Doyle v. Ohio.86 The Brecht majority, however, discounted the
distinction drawn between violations of prophylactic rules and fundamental
rights, concluding that the violation constituted "trial error" implicating
an important constitutional right which did not involve infringement on a
prophylactic rule at all.8 7 Thus, while the Seventh Circuit's formulation
and application of a rule requiring a showing of prejudice was limited to
its consideration of what it had assumed was a violation of a prophylactic
rule, the Court rejected its analysis and applied the formulation generally
to review of all claims involving trial error. 88
The creation of a prejudice requirement results in two different
problems for the dual system of enforcement of federal constitutional
rights. First, state appellate courts are still required to apply the "harmless
error" rule of Chapman v. California. Thus, a state appellate court may
avoid enforcement of a federal claim when it appears that the violation
did not contribute to conviction or impair the accused's right to a fair
trial, or where the evidence against the accused was so overwhelming that
the conviction demonstrates no prejudice to his interests. Doubt is to be
resolved in favor of the accused, however, and an appellate court concerned
about eventual federal review might well have been concerned that on
federal review another court would consider its evaluation of the claim
and application of the reasonable doubt standard erroneous, ultimately
ordering the conviction vacated. Following Brecht, however, state appellate
courts will certainly understand that in the absence of the statistically
unlikely grant of certiorari for review in the United States Supreme Court, 89
86. 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (holding defendant's silence after being advised of warnings required by
Miranda not proper subject of comment, even to impeach defendant's testimony at trial). Doyle was
limited by the Court's later decision in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982), in which the Court held
that in the absence of Miranda warnings, essentially advising the suspect of his right to remain silent,
post-arrest silence could be the subject of cross-examination because the defendant's silence could not
be presumed to have resulted from the exercise of the privilege about which he had not been advised.
One might suppose that this approach, which runs contrary to the traditional presumption that citizens
know the law - presumably including the law concerning their rights upon arrest, a routine feature
of citizen/police encounters on television and in film - would cause some officers to simply withhold
the warnings. The silent suspect would be subject to impeachment; the suspect deciding to offer an
explanation would later learn during trial that he had, in fact, been advised of his rights prior to
having waived them. Doyle imposes a prophylactic rule. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1370.
87. Brecht, at 5-7: "Under the rationale of Doyle, due process is violated whenever the prosecution
uses for impeachment purposes a defendant's post-Miranda silence. Doyle thus does not bear the
fallmarks of a prophylactic rule." Id. at 7.
88. Id. at 7, defining "trial error" as error which "occur[s] during the presentation of the case
to the jury" and which may be subjected to harmless error analysis because it "may ... be
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine [the effect it
had on the trial]." Arizona v. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991). Compare Mikes v. Borg,
947 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3055 (1992) (standard for review of insufficient
evidence claim same whether raised o direct appellate review or by habeas corpus).
89. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 1993 WL 119753 at 21, n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part: "Of course a federal forum is theoretically available in this Court, by writ of
certiorari. Quite obviously, however, this mode of review cannot be generally applied due to practical
limitations.) See Sonte v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the petitioner's burden in any subsequent federal habeas action will be far
more difficult than it had been prior to Brecht. Consequently, state
appellate judges less sensitive to enforcement of federal constitutional
protections than their federal counterparts may find it tactically acceptable
to affirm state court convictions, rather than reverse, even when a doubt
as to harm exists.
Imposition of this higher threshhold for reversal in federal habeas
rather than on direct appeal in state court may ultimately mean that state
court errors in assessing harm or recognizing federal rights violations at
all may be excused once the habeas court is required to ascertain whether
the petitioning state inmate can demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from
the alleged error. A claim not resulting in reversal under the more beneficial
standard of "harmless error" analysis-the reasonable doubt standard-
due to state appellate court error in analyzing the claim may eventually
fail in federal habeas because the reviewing court concludes that the
petitioner could not meet his burden of demonstrating that the complained-
of error was substantial or injurious. Thus, the role of habeas in serving
to check state court error in disposing of federal claims may ultimately be
seriously undermined by the Court's adoption of the prejudice standard
in Brecht v. Abrahamson.
Second, the imposition of a standard incorporating proof of prejudice
will necessarily limit the success of many state inmates relying on federal
habeas corpus for vindication of federal rights violations. Petitioners
entitled to relief under the Chapman harmless error standard will invariably
suffer the consequences in some cases of the requirement to demonstrate
harm as well as violation of federally protected procedural rights. Counsel
will be required to develop factual and theoretical bases for claims of
prejudice, rather than relying on the presumption of prejudice inherent in
Chapman's requirement that harmlessness be shown beyond a reasonable
doubt. The need to articulate and support a theory of prejudice will prove
as critical to the success of the federal habeas petition as proof of the
underlying violation itself.
Further restriction on availability of federal review would undoubtedly
reduce the litigation workload in non-capital and capital cases alike and
expedite executions in capital cases. 90 The limitation on inmate access to
federal courts may also result in significant long term costs to the criminal
justice system. These costs are not likely to be directly reflected in caseload
or judicial time devoted to the conduct of evidentiary hearings, but in
terms of the perception that the courts are failing to vindicate important
rights which serve to protect the innocent from improperly being deprived
of liberty through criminal conviction. The system of "federalized" indi-
vidual rights relied upon by the Court in Michigan v. Long demands
90. See, e.g., Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377 (1984) (vacating stay of execution where
petitioner's claims could have been presented in a prior application for relief but were not).
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continuing existence of a vital habeas corpus remedy at the federal level
to ensure state enforcement of the minimal level of constitutional guar-
antees afforded by the federal constitution. 9'
II. THE BURDENS IMPOSED UPON DEFENSE COUNSEL
The Court's developing federal habeas law is particularly burdensome
for defense counsel because it imposes such high standards of competence
in order to ensure that basic claims of rights violations will ultimately be
heard by federal habeas courts. This is not to suggest that high standards
of both ethical and technical competence should not be demanded of
defense counsel, but at a time when the criminal justice system is already
stressed by the need for competent counsel, imposition of even higher
standards ultimately weighs against involvement of interested attorneys in
criminal practice.
The ratification this past term of a state procedural bar as an imped-
iment to federal review of even substantial claims, in Coleman v. Thomp-
son,92 can serve only to discourage conscientious practitioners from assuming
the burden of representing indigent criminal defendants. 9 Any error in
representation, ranging from mere inadvertence to a failure to recognize a
developing or novel theory of law demanding preservation, 94 will eventually
call counsel's competence and dedication into question. At the same time
that the Court supplanted the "deliberate bypass" standard95 in favor of
the "cause and prejudice" standard 96 for determining when a federal habeas
court is barred from considering a constitutional claim arising in a state
91. Nor can one assume that state courts will implement federal directives as a matter of
deference. In Anderson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 868, 873-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc), for
instance, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals specifically rejected reliance on the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982), for the
proposition that the Texas capital sentencing scheme failed to adequately afford proper deference to
the role of mitigating circumstances in the capital sentencing process. The court observed that it was
not bound by the decisions of "lower federal courts." Id. Later, in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989), the Supreme Court concluded that the Texas scheme was constitutionally defective in certain
instances in failing to provide for an appropriate vehicle for consideration of mitigating circumstances
in the sentencing process.
See also Thomas, J., concurring in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 846 (1993) (arguing state
appellate courts are not bound by decisions of lower federal courts on matters of federal constitutional
interpretation, but only upon decisions of United States Supreme Court, based on Supremacy Clause).
92. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
93. The shortage of attorneys willing to undertake death penalty representation has already
reached the crisis stage. See, Talbot D'Alemberte, The Heroism of Steve Bright, 77 A.B.A. J. 8 (Sept.
1991) (documenting individual dedication of death penalty counsel); Michael Mello, Facing Death
Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 513 (1988); Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Capital Punishment, 102 HARv. L. Rev. 1035, 1040 (1989).
94. For example, a deliberate failure by competent counsel not to raise an issue on direct appeal
based on perception that the issue is not likely to be successful does not excuse procedural default on
the claim. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534-36 (1986).
95. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) had imposed a standard of "deliberate bypass," i.e., a
strategic or tactical decision undertaken by the petitioner or counsel to circumvent state resolution of
a federal claim by deliberately failing to raise it in the federal forum. In Coleman, the Court expressly
buried this standard for ascertaining the impact of state procedural default in federal habeas. Ill S.
Ct. at 2565.
96. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (rejecting application of "deliberate bypass"
standard for excusing state procedural default of federal constitutional claims).
19921 FEDERAL HABEAS REFORM
trial, 97 the Court also reiterated that ineffective assistance of counsel - in
the constitutional sense98 - would satisfy the "cause" prong of the new
test.99
One difficulty in applying the standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel in the constitutional sense is that such a finding virtually requires
a showing that but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have
suffered conviction. 10° Thus, unless the errors of counsel probably contrib-
uted to the conviction, the standard cannot be met, regardless of counsel's
deficiency in performance. 0'
Consequently, counsel undertaking representation in criminal cases
must be aware of two sources of extraordinary pressure imposed by the
Court's latest pronouncements on federal habeas. First, counsel represent-
ing criminal defendants at trial and on direct appeal must recognize that
any error in performance or judgment in the exercise of trial strategy -
or, indeed, any perceived error - is likely to ultimately generate a claim
of ineffectiveness. This is true even when the apparent error represents,
for instance, merely an incorrect assessment of the likely merits of a point
which might be raised on appeal. In Smith v. Murray,l°2 defense counsel
decided not to raise an issue relating to improper admission of expert
97. Coleman, I 1 I S. Ct. at 2565.
98. In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), the Court held that counsel's failure to properly
preserve error in a state proceeding did not satisfy the "cause" prong of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977) for procedural default. Only if the conviction is fundamentally unfair in that it likely
resulted in the conviction of an innocent person, 477 U.S. at 495-96, or upon a showing of
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, id. at 492, could the federal court proceed to address
the issue on the merits. A mere inadvertent failure by competent counsel or failure to recognize the
existence of a legal issue of merit is insufficient to warrant relief. Id. at 487-88.
99. Coleman, 11 S. Ct. at 2566. Since Coleman had no right to effective assistance of counsel
in the state post-conviction proceeding in which his attorney's inadvertence resulted in procedural bar
to consideration of the federal claims, he could not rely on a claim of "constitutionally ineffective
assistance" in showing "cause" for the state procedural default. Id.
100. The test for constitutional ineffectiveness was set forth by the Court in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). There, the Court observed: "The benchmark for judging any claim
of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686.
This standard does not impose a requirement that the accused prove that he was factually innocent
of the crime, however, and relief is apparently available when the performance of trial counsel was
so deficient as to contribute to the conviction of an individual who otherwise would probably not
have suffered conviction. If reliability as a test rests on ensuring a fair trial to protect against an
improper finding of guilt, regardless of the moral culpability of the accused, then Strickland does not
require proof that the petitioner was, in fact, innocent in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance.
101. Thus, prejudice to the defendant forms the second prong of the Strickland test for ineffectiveness
under the Sixth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 687. This approach necessarily suggests that the Court has
moved away from a posture in which the deficiency of performance requires relief to protect the
integrity of the guarantee to one in which the reliability of the fact-finding process is paramount. For
example, in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 844 (1993), the Court considered an ineffective
assistance claim arising in a most unusual factual context. Counsel failed to preserve error in a state
capital trial based on existing Eighth Circuit precedent which was ultimately overruled by the Supreme
Court. Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim was predicated on counsel's failure to preserve error based on
the then existing state of the law, asking for relief on his ineffectiveness claim when, in fact, he clearly
would not have been entitled to relief on the merits had the state court failed to correctly apply the
law. The Court held that, in this rare circumstance, counsel's error did not demonstrate prejudice
because Fretwell could not demonstrate that the outcome would have been different had the state trial
court complied with existing Eighth Circuit case law.
102. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
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psychiatric testimony 13 on direct appeal, resulting in a default under
Virginia law as to that issue.'° The Supreme Court concluded that failure
to comply with state procedural rules relating to preservation and pres-
entation of error resulting in bar likewise barred federal consideration of
the claim. 05
The problem in Smith lies not so much in its result, but in the
implication of the exercise of judgment by defense counsel. In Jones v.
Barnes,1 6 a majority of the Court directed counsel to exercise professional
judgment in determining which issues to include and argue in the brief on
direct appeal, carefully advising: "A brief that raises every colorable issue
runs the risk of burying good arguments . . .in a verbal mound made up
of strong and weak contentions."' 10 The majority expressly declined to
hold that the accused's demand or preference that particular points be
included in the brief had to be honored by appointed counsel, over a
stinging dissent issued by Justice Brennan.108
Jones reinforces the proposition that it is counsel's expertise and
professional judgment which should dominate the strategy to be pursued
on appeal; Smith warns that an error in judgment in paring the points to
be argued may have devastating impact on the client's future. Failure to
raise a meritorious point may result in forfeiture of reliance on a new rule
subsequently announced by the Supreme Court that might otherwise have
been applicable to afford the client relief, pursuant to the holding in
Teague v. Lane."°9 Thus, even when counsel's best exercise of legal judg-
ment results in the default - as opposed to inadvertence or negligence
such as the failure to timely file the petition for appeal in Coleman"° -
103. The testimony was arguably inadmissible because the psychiatrist examined the accused
without first advising him of his right not to participate in the interview, as required by Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
104. 477 U.S. at 533. The Court's opinion notes that the petitioner had previously raised the
issue in a state post-conviction proceeding, where the state procedural default rule was imposed to bar
consideration of the claim on the merits. Id. at 531-32.
105. Id. at 534. The Court concluded that failure to raise the claim on direct appeal resulted in
procedural default barring subsequent review of the claim by federal habeas:
Our cases, however, leave no doubt that a deliberate, tactical decision not to pursue a
particular claim is the very antithesis of the kind of circumstance that would warrant excusing
a defendant's failure to adhere to a State's legitimate rules for the fair and orderly disposition
of its criminal cases.
Id.
106. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
107. Id. at 753.
108. Id. at 755. ("The Court, subtly, but unmistakably adopts a different conception of the
defense lawyer's role - he need do nothing beyond what the State, not his client, considers most
important. In many ways, having a lawyer becomes one of the many indignities visited upon someone
who has the ill fortune to run afoul of the criminal justice system. I cannot accept the notion that
lawyers are one of the punishments a person receives merely for being accused of a crime."). Id. at
764.
109. 489 U.S. 288, 310 & n.2 (1989) (Unless falling within an exception, "new constitutional rules
of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new
rules are announced.").
110. Coleman, Ill S. Ct. at 2546. The petition for appeal from a denial of state habeas corpus
was filed three days late. Had this error occurred on the direct appeal - where effective assistance
of counsel has been held mandated by the Supreme Court - the defendant would have been entitled
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the defendant will suffer the consequences of the default unless the error
rises to the level of constitutional ineffectiveness.
The net result of these decisions is that counsel undertaking represen-
tation must now understand that any failure of preservation or other
strategic or tactical error in representation may now be subject to a claim
of constitutional ineffectiveness. The second source of tension in discharg-
ing duties of representation lies in the overwhelming pressure to try all
means to preserve appellate or habeas review, including a necessary pressure
to raise ineffectiveness of counsel claims. For many attorneys, the type of
after the fact judgment that comes into play in assessing another counsel's
efforts at representation is unpalatable, just as it often is to reviewing
courts.,II
Nevertheless, a failure to raise a claim of ineffective assistance to
show "cause" for procedural default at trial or on direct appeal most
likely will mean that the claim will be forever lost, regardless of its merits.
Moreover, post-conviction counsel's failure to properly evaluate procedural
default in terms of ineffectiveness and raise the appropriate claim during
state post-conviction proceedings will also result in a bar to eventual
consideration of the claim, since Coleman holds that in the absence of a
constitutional guarantee to assistance of counsel in post-conviction
proceedings" 2 a defect in state post-conviction representation will not excuse
procedural default.
In addition to the need to raise claims of ineffectiveness in order to
afford the client some prospect for eventual consideration of defaulted
federal claims, counsel must also be prepared to raise such claims for
consideration as fundamental error under state law. While an allegation
of constitutional ineffectiveness may not be sustained in support of con-
sideration of a procedurally defaulted point of error on the merits, state
courts may nevertheless consider the claim as a matter of fundamental,
jurisdictional or plain error. In Sochor v. Florida,"3 for instance, the
Court considered the problem of failure of preservation and a plurality
held that state applicqtion of its law of procedural default barred review
of the claim on the merits." 4 However, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Blackmun, argued that this type of claim was one of fundamental error
under Florida law, which could be urged despite a lack of objection at
trial," 5 and which they concluded had impliedly been considered and
to an appeal despite the procedural error in failing to file, pursuant to Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387
(1985).
111. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 716 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (counsel's performance
not to be assessed through hindsight).
112. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (no constitutional right to assistance of counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings even when sentence of death imposed); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551 (1987) (no constitutional right to assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings,
although state law may provide for counsel; even so, counsel's performance in such proceedings not
judged by constitutional standard).
113. 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992). The Court considered a claim that an improper aggravating
circumstance had been considered by the sentencing jury at Sochor's capital trial, resulting in an
improper imposition of the death penalty.
114. Id. at 2119-20. The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Souter, joined in part by the Chief
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rejected by the state court on the merits.116 Thus, counsel faced with the
problem of litigating an unpreserved claim must not only consider the
need to argue ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance below, but the option
of raising the claim as a matter of fundamental error as well.
The problem of procedural lapse is demonstrated by the Court's
decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi."7 There, trial counsel had objected to
a prosecution argument suggesting to the capital sentencing jury that any
error they might make in deliberations would be corrected on appellate
review, but counsel on direct appeal did not present or urge the issue for
consideration by the state supreme court." 8 Instead, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court raised the issue sua sponte, pursuant to its "plain error
rule,"" 9 and addressed the tenor of the argument in its opinion.' 20 The
Court considered the Eighth Amendment claim that this line of argument
distorted the jury's function in determining the appropriate penalty, finding
that no bar to review of the claim could be discerned from any application
of a state rule of procedural default by the court below.' 2' The majority,
through Justice Marshall, concluded that the argument was constitutionally
impermissible in undermining the reliability of the capital sentencing func-
tion. 22
Thus, Caldwell demonstrates the value of raising even defaulted issues
in the context of capital prosecutions when the bar of procedural default
has not been explicitly imposed by the state appellate court. Clearly, had
that bar been imposed, counsel's recourse would have been to make an
allegation of constitutionally ineffective assistance, a more difficult hurdle
Justice, Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas, observed that the petitioner's claim
that the aggravating circumstance - that the "capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel," FLA. STAT. § 921-141(5)(h) (1991) - was disposed of by the state supreme court on the
adequate and independent state ground of procedural default because the relevant instructions were
not objected to at trial.
115. 112 S. Ct. at 2125-28 & nn.6-8. Instead, they specifically looked to Florida law of fundamental
error to excuse the apparent procedural default, arguing that under state law error of the type urged
by petitioner Sochor is reviewable in the absence of objection. Justice Stevens concluded: "Petitioner's
failure to object to the instruction at trial did not deprive the Florida Supreme Court or this Court
of the power to correct the obvious constitutional error." Id. at 2127.
116. Id. at n.7. Justice Stevens expressly observed in this footnote:
The Florida Supreme Court's statement that none of the alleged errors in the jury instructions
had been "preserved for appeal," 580 So.2d 595, 602 (1991), merely raised the question
whether they should nevertheless be reviewed under the "fundamental error" exception.
That question was answered by the court's statement that petitioner's claims "have no
merit."
Moreover, Justice Stevens found probative the State's failure to plead procedural default in opposing
Sochor's petition for writ of certiorari and arguing instead, on the merits, that the language of the
aggravating circumstance was not unconstitutionally vague. 112 S. Ct. at 2127-28.
117. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
118. Id. at 326.
119. Id. at 326-27.
120. Caldwell v. State, 443 So.2d 806, 807 (Miss. 1983). The dissenting state supreme court justice
argued that the argument was so unfair as a matter of state law as to require that the death sentence
be vacated. Id. at 815.
121. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 327-28 (observing that the Mississippi Supreme Court had adopted
policy of relaxing procedural default rule in capital cases).
122. Id. at 341.
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to overcome since not only would the showing of error have been required,
but arguably, a greater showing of prejudice in this context might have
been required to have the issue even considered in the context of federal
habeas corpus. Subsequent decisions have demonstrated the trap set for
unwary counsel by the application of the procedural default and "new
rule" rules in considering constitutional claims.
In Dugger v. Adams,'23 the Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on
Caldwell for the proposition that a prosecutorial argument had improperly
stressed the lack of finality attached to the jury's sentencing verdict under
the Florida capital punishment statute, which provides for judicial override
of jury sentences in limited circumstances. No objection was made to the
argument at trial and the issue was not raised until the filing of a second
post-conviction motion for relief, following the decision in Caldwell.'24
Ultimately, the claim was raised in a successor federal habeas petition,
resulting in a finding by the Eleventh Circuit that Caldwell had produced
a novel rule that could not have been anticipated at the time of trial, thus
excusing the failure to comply with state procedural requirements.' 25 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the merits of the petitioner's Caldwell
claim were not dispositive on the issue of procedural default. 26
Similarly, in Sawyer v. Smith, 27 petitioner also sought to rely on
Caldwell in support of his claim that the prosecutor had improperly stressed
to his capital sentencing jury that it would not be the only decision-maker
to consider the sentence and that it would be subject to review by other
courts.'2 8 The Court concluded, however, that Caldwell did announce a
''new rule" of procedure which could not be relied on by the petitioner,
whose conviction became final before the decision was announced.' 29
Thus, Dugger v. Adams and Sawyer v. Smith can generally be read
together to hold that failure to preserve error might be excused due to the
novel nature of the claim, but that reliance on a subsequent decision
recognizing a rule based on the novel nature of the claim is probably
precluded by the application of Teague's "new rule" analysis. At best,
then, Caldwell emerges as a case in which the petitioner was simply
123. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
124. Adams v. State, 484 So.2d 1216, 1217, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1103 (1986). The Florida
Supreme Court held that the claim was procedurally barred by the petitioner's failure to preserve the
claim by arguing it on direct appeal. Id.
125. Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (lth Cir. 1986), modified, 816 F.2d 1493 (lth Cir.
1987).
126. 489 U.S. at 408 n.4.
127. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
128. Id. at 231-32. The prosecutor argued, in part:
[I]t is very easy for defense lawyers to try and make each and every one of you feel like
you are pulling the switch. That is not so. It is not so and if you are wrong in your decision
believe me, believe me there will be others who will be behind you to either agree with you
or to say you are wrong so I ask that you do have the courage of your convictions.
Id.
129. ld. at 236. The Court held that since the holding in Caldwell was not "dictated by existing
law at the time petitioner's conviction became final" it was subject to the restriction on application
of new rules announced in Teague v. Lane, 289 U.S. 288, 301 (1989), and petitioner could not rely
on the rule because it did not fall within the Teague exception of "watershed rules of criminal
procedure that guarantee the accuracy of a criminal proceeding." Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 233.
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fortunate to obtain a majority response to his improperly preserved con-
stitutional claim. The two later cases demonstrate that claims which might
have equivalent merit may suffer from a procedural bar due to counsel's
failure to appreciate the potential success in a timely trial objection and
preservation of trial error through the direct appeal.
The net effect of the Court's jurisprudence in this area is to heighten
the stakes for criminal defendants who suffer the consequences of mistakes
made by even the most conscientious counsel. Because these errors now
rest in an environment of virtual non-forgiveness, counsel undertaking
representation in criminal matters - particular capital cases in which the
death penalty has been imposed - must realize that any error, whether
strategic or negligent, may result in forfeiture of an otherwise meritorious
claim. This demand for a heightened level of competence and lack of
human error can only serve as a major source of disincentive for competent
counsel to pursue representation in criminal cases. 130
III. THE LOSS OF INNOCENCE
Perhaps the most perplexing problem confronting the Court this term
involved the issue most fundamental to notions of due process, the
conviction of an innocent defendant. In Herrera v. Collins,3' a Texas
death penalty case, the precise issue before the Court was whether a claim
of actual innocence, essentially standing alone, is cognizable in federal
habeas corpus. The Fifth Circuit, considering Herrera's successor petition,
ruled that he had defaulted on all grounds asserted except the claim of
actual innocence,' 32 which was intertwined with a claimed Brady'33 violation.
The circuit court concluded that the petitioner's factual pleading of the
alleged Brady violation was wholly insufficient, however, to establish
misconduct on the part of the prosecutor. 3 4
130. These pressures discourage career commitment to criminal practice at a time when resources
have already strained the ability of defender systems to provide assistance of counsel to the majority
of criminal defendants, who are indigent and unable to afford retained counsel. See, e.g., Ruth
Marcus, So Many Defendants, So Little Time: Public Defenders, Impossible Caseloads, WASH. POST
NAT'L WKLY. ED., Mar. 1992, at 33 (documenting stress on individual public defenders in New Orleans
resulting in imposition of restriction on defender caseloads by state court holding system of representation
unconstitutional).
131. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), aff'g 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1991). The history of this case is lengthy.
Petitioner's capital murder conviction and sentence of death was affirmed by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals in Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1131 (1985). Petitioner was denied state habeas corpus relief by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals in Ex parte Herrera, 819 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) and subsequently sought federal
habeas corpus relief. Denial of his first federal habeas petition was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
in Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 307 (1990). Denial of his
second federal habeas petition was affirmed by Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1991).
132. 954 F.2d 1029, 1032.
133. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring prosecution to provide defense with
exculpatory evidence).
134. Herrera claimed that newspaper clippings and affidavits indicated that the prosecutor who
had obtained his conviction and death sentence knew that his brother, Raul, had actually committed
the capital murder for which he was convicted. The Fifth Circuit noted that nothing in the affidavits
or clippings indicated that the prosecutor had this knowledge prior to petitioner's trial, or that the
[Vol. 61, No. 2
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Rather, the only claim before the habeas court which could be
considered factually significant was the claim of Herrera's actual innocence
on the murder charge, a claim the district court found sufficiently com-
pelling to warrant issuance of a stay of execution.'35 The Fifth Circuit,
however, found that "Herrera's claim of 'actual innocence' present[ed] no
such substantial claim for relief" required to justify a stay of execution 3 6
pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Delo v. Stokes.' The circuit
court found support for its conclusion that a claim of "actual innocence"
is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus in Townsend v. Sain,3 where
the Supreme Court rejected federal habeas corpus as an appropriate vehicle
for asserting a claim of innocence based on newly discovered evidence. 3 9
The Court concluded that "the existence merely of newly discovered
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief
on federal habeas corpus."' 14 The holding in Herrera, following the Court's
language in Townsend v. Sain, certainly suggested that the Fifth Circuit
correctly interpreted the current state of federal habeas law.
The circuit court also observed that, under Texas law, Herrera's claim
of "actual innocence" would fail as a basis for state post-conviction
relief.' 4' In reviewing Texas case law, the Fifth Circuit panel correctly
noted the holding in Ex parte Binder, 42 which precludes state habeas relief
for newly discovered evidence. But as a political matter, the court ignored
two other Texas decisions in which claims of "actual innocence" by death
row inmates ultimately did result in state post-conviction relief.
In Ex parte Adams, 43 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately
granted relief in a capital case based on evidence of "actual innocence"
information would not have been known to petitioner at the time of his trial. Raul was deceased at
the time the issue was raised, but the affidavits included statements made both by Raul's son and
former attorney that Raul had admitted the killing to them. Petitioner also attached an affidavit from
Raul's son testifying that Raul, Jr. was present during the murder, that petitioner was not present,
and that he had told a police officer this information, only to be told by the officer not to repeat the
statement. 954 F.2d at 1032-33.
135. Id. at 1033.
136. Id.
137. 495 U.S. 320 (1990); see also supra note 2.
138: 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The Circuit Court had earlier followed Townsend v. Sain in rejecting
another Texas inmate's claim of newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. Ellis v. Collins, 788
F. Supp. 317 (S.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd, 956 F.2d 76 (5th Cir.), cert. and stay denied, 112 S. Ct. 1285
(1992).
139. In Townsend, the Court held that the allegation of newly discovered evidence would support
a claim for federal habeas relief only if it bore on the "constitutionality of the applicant's detention."
372 U.S. at 317.
140. Id.
141. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d at 1034, citing Exparte Binder, 660 S.W.2d 103, 104-06 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983) (en banc). The Fifth Circuit's reference to Texas law is significant because the
district court, in granting the stay, had afforded Herrera an opportunity to raise his actual innocence
claim in a state post-conviction relief application, thus fulfilling the exhaustion requirement and
permitting the state trial court the necessary opportunity to conduct factfinding under TEx. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon 1965). Such factfinding would then bind the habeas court. In
dissolving the stay, the Fifth Circuit concluded that petitioner Herrera had asserted no claim cognizable
under state habeas corpus law.
142. 660 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc).
143. 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Adam's capital murder conviction and sentence of
1992]
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intertwined with a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in suppression of
exculpatory evidence. The case had been the subject of extraordinary
national publicity, including an award winning documentary movie, The
Thin Blue Line.'" And Clarence Lee Brandley won relief from a capital
conviction and death sentence after the CBS national news program Sixty
Minutes documented the flimsy evidence that had been marshaled to
support his conviction.14 The Texas court ultimately found the suppression
of evidence by the prosecutor that another individual had confessed to the
crime, and evidence that other witnesses had given perjured testimony,
warranted relief in the case.'46
The Adams and Brandley cases do not demonstrate that the Texas
court would have overruled Binder and held that claims of "actual inno-
cence" or "newly discovered evidence" are now proper matters for state
habeas corpus. They do suggest, however, a certain sensitivity to the
problem of executing innocent defendants. This might well have caused
the state courts to treat differently the Brady claim which the Fifth Circuit
rejected as factually insufficient.
The "actual innocence" issue presented a number of serious problems
for a Court that might otherwise have been content to defer to the Fifth
Circuit's correct application of Townsend v. Sain, not the least of which
being that the vitality of that precedent has been questioned by the holding
in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 47 albeit on different grounds. 48
The most significant factor complicating reliance on Townsend to
affirm the Fifth Circuit's holding lies in the fact that public and judicial
support for the death penalty will likely erode in the face of the execution
of an individual ultimately proved innocent of the capital crimes. 49
death was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Adams v. Texas, 577 S.W.2d 717
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979). However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the death sentence in
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). Upon reacquiring jurisdiction of the case and after the governor
commuted the death sentence to that of life imprisonment, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
defendant's conviction and life sentence. Adams v. Texas, 624 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
Adams was eventually released as a result of state habeas corpus proceedings.
144. The conduct of the Dallas County, Texas District Attorney's Office also drew national
attention. See Richard L. Fricker, Crime and Punishment in Dallas, 75 A.B.A. J. 52 (1989). Adams
documented his struggle for freedom in ADAMS V. TEXAS (1991).
145. Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
146. Id. at 888-89 & n.2.
147. 112 S. Ct. 1215 (1992); see also supra notes 15, 39-41, and accompanying text.
148. In fact, Justice Scalia's concurrence includes his observation that the Court's holding leaves
intact the principle that actual innocence claims are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus, as the
Court held in Townsend v. Sain, and thus, the reliance on that decision for this proposition by the
circuit courts should be considered undisturbed by the majority's hypothetical consideration of a
compelling actual innocence claim. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875.
149. Of course, documentation of execution of innocent criminal defendants is not a new matter,
having been the subject of studies undertaken by opponents of capital punishment. See, e.g., MICHAEL
L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRoNEous CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1993). What
makes Herrera such a potentially compelling matter is that the Supreme Court was forced to rule on
the issue of actual innocence as a ground for federal habeas review, suggesting not that innocent
defendants might be erroneously executed, but that the Court could hold that federal courts have no
jurisdiction to even consider colorable actual innocence claims. This decision could prove particularly
compelling, particularly given the Court's refusal to consider Roger Coleman's similar last minute plea
for judicial relief from a Virginia execution based upon his claim of actual innocence. See Coleman
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In fact, the Court's ultimate disposition of the actual innocence claim
in Herrera neither expressly affirms the Fifth Circuit's rigid reliance on a
rule of preclusion with respect to such claims, nor clearly affords comfort
for those expecting the Court to conclude that actual innocence does
present a theory for relief requiring federal habeas review. Chief Justice
Rehnquist authored the Court's opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,'50 yet separate concurrences authored by
Justices O'Connor'5 ' and Scalia,5 2 and Justice White's separate opinion
concurring in the judgment,'13 leave in some doubt the ultimate disposition
of the issue presented by the Fifth Circuit's opinion.
Instead of confronting the question of habeas jurisdiction over claims
of actual innocence standing alone, the Herrera majority simply reviewed
the evidence offered in support of the petitioner's actual innocence claim. 54
The majority then concluded that the evidence was insufficient to meet
even the threshold level of persuasiveness necessary to demonstrate, a
constitutional violation in execution of the death sentence imposed after a
constitutionally error-free capital trial.'55 The Court noted that the evidence
proffered by petitioner included affidavits containing factual inconsistencies
generated in the eight years since the trial had concluded.' 5 6
The first exculpatory affidavit was given by petitioner's nephew, aged
nine at the time of the murder, who testified that the nephew's father,
rather than petitioner, had actually committed the murder of the police
officer. The other affidavit was provided by former counsel for petitioner's
deceased brother, who testified that the brother had admitted committing
the murder. 117 In response to these belated statements exculpating petitioner
Herrera, the majority noted the factual inconsistencies in the two affidavits
concerning the precise circumstances under which the killing had occurred
and contrasted them with the circumstantial evidence and eyewitness iden-
tifications offered at trial. Further, the Court discussed the handwritten
v. Thompson, 112 S. Ct. 1845 (1992) (denying habeas relief where district court concluded that claim
of innocence was not colorable). Coleman's case received extensive publicity, including a nationally
televised interview from his cell shortly before his final plea for clemency was rejected.
150. 113 S. Ct. at 853.
151. Id. at 870. Justice Kennedy joined this concurrence.
152. Id. at 874. Justice Thomas joined this concurrence.
153. Id. at 875.
154. Id. at 869-70.
155. Id. at 870.
156. Id. at 869.
157. Id. In contrast to the majority's cursory dismissal of the affidavit offered by former counsel
for Herrera's brother, identified as the actual killer in the affidavit of his own son, Justice Blackmun
observed:
In one of the affidavits, Hector Villarreal, a licensed attorney and former state court judge,
swears under penalty of perjury that his client Raul Herrera confessed that he, and not
petitioner, committed the murders. No matter what the majority may think of the inconsistencies
in the affidavits or the strength of the evidence presented at trial, this affidavit alone is
sufficient to raise factual questions concerning petitioner's innocence that cannot be resolved
simply by examining the affidavits and the petition.
113 S. Ct. at 876, 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Souter joined in this portion
of the dissenting opinion.
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note, apparently authored by petitioner, in which he admitted the killings.'58
The majority then concluded its review of the comparative weight of the
affidavits and trial evidence: "That proof, even when considered alongside
petitioner's belated affidavits, points strongly to petitioner's guilt." 59
The majority embarked on this weighing of the available evidence
after posing a hypothetical circumstance under which a claim of innocence
might be sufficiently supported by credible evidence to raise a constitutional
violation' 60 under the Eighth16' or Fourteenth Amendments. 62 In deciding
the case based upon its rejection of the factual sufficiency of petitioner's
proof by affidavits, the majority did not ultimately dispose of the question
of federal habeas jurisdiction over actual innocence claims in state death
penalty cases. This led to a spirited divergence of opinion among the
justices in considering what principle should govern in the event the
"extraordinary threshold" of proof is, indeed, met.
Justice O'Connor expressly adopted the position that a factual inno-
cence claim could provide a proper basis for exercise of federal habeas
jurisdiction, by opening her concurrence: "I cannot disagree with the
fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with
the Constitution." 163 However, her rationale for joining the majority was
stated with equal clarity: "Petitioner is not innocent, in any sense of the
word.' 64 Her review of the evidence, focusing particularly on the incul-
patory letter written by the petitioner and admitted into evidence at his
trial, warranted her conclusion that petitioner could not meet any threshold
reasonably set for habeas consideration of his actual innocence claim. 65
Moreover, Justice O'Connor carefully assessed the relief actually
ordered by the habeas court in entering its stay of execution. She observed
that the district court had not asserted jurisdiction over the claim, but
158. 113 S. Ct. at 870. The text of the handwritten letter is included in the majority opinion. Id.
at 857, n.I.
159. Id. at 869.
160. Id. Without deciding that such a circumstance could ever actually be demonstrated by a
capital defendant seeking to avoid execution, the majority observed that avoidance of the burden upon
the state for retrial would require an extraordinarily high threshold of proof.
161. Herrera relied on the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment"
in arguing that execution of an innocent defendant would establish a federal constitutional claim
absent any other procedural violation. 113 S. Ct. at 856-57. In capital cases, reliance on the Eighth
Amendment as a source for indirect attack on the circumstances of imposition or execution of the
death penalty has been successful, even though capital punishment, per se, does not offend the
protections afforded by the amendment. See 113 S. Ct. at 876-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. 113 S. Ct. at 864 (relying on guarantee of "due process of law"). The reliance on both the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as a source of potential relief is not inconsequential. As the
concurring opinions of Justices O'Connor and White suggest, any liberalization of federal habeas law
to accommodate actual innocence claims might be limited to situations in which the death penalty had
been imposed. 113 S. Ct. at 870-71, 876, respectively. Thus, a claim might be cognizable under the
Eighth Amendment because the case involved execution of a death sentence, whereas the Court might
conclude that no due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment would be implicated, denying
non-capital defendants the option of pursuing actual innocence claims, standing alone, in federal
habeas actions.
163. 113 S. Ct. at 870.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 872 (observing that petitioner's affidavits offered in support of his petition for habeas
relief "pale when compared to proof at trial").
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instead had merely directed petitioner to seek relief in the state courts. 16
She then concluded that Texas courts would not entertain such claims and
that the factual insufficiency of petitioner's claim did not warrant exercise
of federal jurisdiction. 167 Thus, while the Fifth Circuit had correctly applied
Texas law in holding that newly discovered evidence of innocence is
cognizable in the context of a new trial motion, 68 but not as a matter of
state habeas corpus, 69 the Court might have held that Texas is required
to provide a vehicle for litigation of such claims. 70
In relying on the Texas procedural bar to newly discovered evidence
claims not presented within thirty days of imposition of sentence, however,
the Court failed to recognize that Texas has recognized the existence of
an "out-of-time motion for new trial"171 which might have afforded
Herrera a vehicle for asserting his claim. Thus, while the majority, O'Con-
nor concurrence, and circuit court all correctly referred to the general
preclusion of untimely newly discovered evidence claims under Texas
procedural rules, its deference to Texas law may well have been flawed by
failure to recognize this alternative means of presenting new claims.
Although Justice O'Connor argued forcefully that even the majority
opinion indicates that the Constitution would be offended by the execution
of a factually innocent accused, she failed to indicate precisely the level
of proof which would trigger federal intervention in the event state
procedural rules barred untimely presentation of such claims. 72 The fact
166. Id. at 873. The majority opinion did not draw this distinction and instead, merely observed
that Texas courts do not recognize claims of newly discovered evidence after the time for filing the
motion for new trial. Id. at 860.
167. Id. at 873. Significantly, Justice O'Connor's opinion touches on one possible disposition that
the Court did not take: that the Constitution would require state courts to provide a forum for review
of actual innocence claims which would otherwise be barred by procedural rules of limitations. She
noted: "Of course, the Texas courts would not be free to turn petitioner away if the Constitution
required otherwise. But the District Court did not hold that the Constitution required them to entertain
petitioner's claim. On these facts, that would be an extraordinary holding." Id.
168. Id. at 860, 873 (citing TEx. R. Ap. PRoc. 31(a)(l), requiring motions for new trial based
on newly discovered evidence must be brought within 30 days after imposition or suspension of
sentence).
169. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1034 (5th Cir. 1992).
170. The Court could have, therefore, vacated the Fifth Circuit's order itself vacating the stay of
execution entered by the habeas court, and permitted the case to be remanded for presentation of
petitioner's claim in a state proceeding. If the state court, in fact, granted relief under Texas law, the
matter would properly be resolved in state court, proving ultimately that the Fifth Circuit's intervention
in the procedure complicated, rather than expedited, resolution of the claim. But see supra note 166,
noting Justice O'Connor's observation that an order requiring Texas courts to consider the newly
discovered evidence of innocence claim would have been "extraordinary."
171. Sambrano v. State, 754 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (new trial warranted based on
newly discovered evidence where key witness admitted perjury against defendant in subsequent trial
while under oath); Jones v. State, 711 S.W.2d 35, 37 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (new trial warranted
where newly discovered evidence would corroborate testimony of interested witness with that of
disinterested witness); Buitureida v. State, 684 S.W.2d 133, 143-44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (considering
"out-of-time motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence); Whitmore v. State, 570 S.W.2d
889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (new trial required for newly available evidence where co-defendant
asserting Fifth Amendment privilege at defendant's trial subsequently became available as a result of
acquittal in severed trial).
172. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 874.
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that the majority merely dealt with this proposition hypothetically,'
moreover, demonstrates the lack of consensus on this precise point, despite
Justice O'Connor's assurances that the Court's opinion does not mean
that federal habeas jurisdiction could never be properly invoked to entertain
an actual innocence claim standing alone.
Justice White's concurrence in the judgment' 74 suffers less from what
he failed to say than from what he did say. He rejected the factual
sufficiency of Herrera's claim, concluding that in order to be entitled to
relief he "would at the very least be required to show that based on
proffered newly discovered evidence and the entire record before the jury
that convicted him, 'no rational trier of fact could [have found] proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,""' 75 relying on Jackson v. Virginia 76 for
this standard.
What is unclear, however, is whether Justice White's formulation is
intended to provide a standard for review for district courts considering
actual innocence claims, or whether the standard really expresses a thresh-
old for assertion of jurisdiction by a federal habeas court. The difference
is critical, of course, with respect to the right of the accused to petition
for habeas review.
The difficulty with Justice White's standard is that it imposes an
almost internally inconsistent test in gauging the sufficiency of the proffered
evidence. Jackson held that the constitutional standard for sufficiency
permits the reviewing court to view all facts in the light most favorable
to the verdict, resolving conflicting testimony in favor of conviction. 77 If
the trial record discloses sufficient evidence to establish all elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction should be sustained if
the reviewing court faithfully follows the Jackson principle. Consequently,
in pressing for application of this standard, which requires deference to
jury determinations in the resolution of conflicts in the evidence, 71 Justice
White effectively advocates an exception to the core value of Jackson in
requiring the reviewing court to assess whether any rational jury would
have convicted if the newly discovered evidence had been available.
"Newly discovered" evidence of innocence necessarily suggests that
the conviction has been supported by sufficient evidence and, thus, dis-
covery of controverting evidence would never rise to a level sufficient to
require reversal under Jackson because the trier of fact would have been
173. Id. at 869 (the majority discussed this issue "for the sake of argument" only).
174. Id. at 875 (White, J., concurring).
175. Id.
176. 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979).
177. Id. at 318-19.
178. Of course, state appellate courts may engage in re-weighing evidence and reverse based upon
the weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence adduced at trial. Where reversal rests on a
weighing determination by the appellate court, however, retrial is not precluded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982); Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981) (trial court's
grant of new trial based on evidentiary insufficiency bars retrial, whereas new trial based on weighing
of evidence does not).
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positioned to reject that evidence anyway.7 9 The only reasonable expla-
nation for Justice White's analysis is that the newly discovered evidence
must be such that it could not have been ignored by the trier of fact and
would have necessarily compelled a different result, meaning that a "ra-
tional trier of fact" could not have convicted in light of the total record
ultimately developed.
Even the majority recognized that evidence contained in Herrera's
supporting affidavits could have created evidentiary conflicts requiring the
jury to resolve them based upon assessments of credibility. 80 Yet under
Justice White's approach, newly discovered evidence would not afford a
basis for relief in any circumstance in which credibility assessment might
have affected the outcome, based on his reference to the Jackson standard.
Essentially, Justice White's approach, while recognizing as constitu-
tionally impermissible the execution of an innocent accused, would restrict
habeas intervention to those actual innocence claims which rest on excul-
patory evidence which could not have been reconciled with conviction. The
most likely circumstances in which relief would be available would appear
to involve discovery of a corroborated confession of the actual killer not
implicating the defendant as an accomplice; proof that critical state's
evidence was fabricated or the result of perjury; 81 or discovery of physical
evidence exculpating the accused conclusively, such as newly available
DNA testing ruling out the accused as the assailant.18 2
The majority opinion, as well as the concurrences authored by Justices
O'Connor and White, rests on the willingness of appellate judges to engage
in weighing of the evidence developed at trial and contained in the trial
record and the newly discovered evidence, a process typically reserved for
the trier of fact. Of course, no procedure could fairly and efficiently
remand the cause for reconsideration of the trial evidence and assessment
of the newly discovered evidence by the trial jury which convicted and
imposed sentence. But that determination could properly have been made
by the trial judge, who is vested with authority to make precisely such
determinations on newly discovered evidence brought forward in a timely
motion for new trial under Texas law.8 3 This is precisely the process which
the district court's order staying Herrera's execution would have permitted
179. The Court had held in Jackson: "This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility
of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
180. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 870.
181. See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (knowing use of false evidence requires relief).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990) (discussing standards for
admissibility of DNA testing results against the accused); Ralph Spory, Note, DNA Profiling Held
Admissible Under the Relevancy Standard: Prater v. State, 15 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 71 (1992).
Exculpatory DNA test results would clearly be available to the defense as part of the disclosure
obligation placed upon the prosecution by the Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and
in a jurisdiction accepting DNA test results as admissible in criminal trials, would afford the accused
significant factual support for an actual innocence claim.
183. TEX. R. App. PRoc. 31(d) provides that a motion for new trial, including one asserting
newly discovered evidence under Rule 30(b)(6), shall be heard and determined by the trial court.
19921
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had the state trial court agreed to consider the newly discovered evidence
by granting leave to file an out-of-time motion for a new trial. 84
Further, the position suggested by the majority in analyzing the
hypothetical compelling actual innocence claims and expressly adopted by
Justices O'Connor and White, that execution of an innocent accused would
offend the Constitution, recognizes vaguely the existence of a right re-
quiring remedy without setting forth articulable standards as to the showing
of exculpatory proof necessary to justify federal habeas jurisdiction. The
justices hint that at some point intervention by a federal habeas court
would be appropriate - particularly if a clemency plea made to the
governor had failed - but the fear that federal courts will be "deluged
with frivolous claims of actual innocence"'" 5 apparently precluded elabo-
ration of a threshold standard of proof required that would afford guidance
to defense counsel or district courts in understanding the parameters of
habeas jurisdiction in these circumstances.
In contrast to Justice O'Connor's position, Justice Scalia answered
the question posed concerning habeas jurisdiction of actual innocence
claims directly.8 6 He concluded that the Constitution simply does not
provide for review of such claims based on newly discovered evidence, not
in "text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice."' 87 He also observed
that the "embarrassing question" would likely not again be presented to
the Court, since the quantum of evidence necessary to trigger habeas
jurisdiction, assuming the hypothetical circumstances discussed by the
majority, would result in a grant of executive clemency.'88
Certainly, the majority and concurring opinions rely on executive
clemency as the alternative to judicial remedy to vindicate the claim of
.actual innocence sufficiently factually supported to justify relief.8 9 In
dissenting, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, coun-
tered that clemency is simply insufficient to preserve the constitutional
interest in avoiding conviction and execution of an innocent defendant,
arguing that the power of pardon is dependent upon "grace" rather than
right. 190
The Court's disposition in Herrera is troubling for any number of.
reasons. First, the opinions rejecting relief skirt the issue of the level of
proof which would justify federal intervention. Second, the willingness of
the justices to themselves rule on the credibility of the affidavits 9' offered
184. See cases cited, supra note 170.
185. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 874. Further, Justice Scalia explained that he joined fully in the majority opinion
precisely "because there is no legal error in deciding a case by assuming arguendo that an asserted
constitutional right exists." Id. at 875.
188. Id. at 875.
189. Id. at 868 (The majority referred to executive clemency as the "fail safe" in the criminal
justice system.); Id. at 874 (Justice O'Connor notes the "safeguards of clemency and pardon."); Id.
at 875 (Justice Scalia looks to "executive pardon" to avoid re-litigation of the issue.).
190. Id. at 881.
191. This tendency to supplant the fact-finder's function is not limited to Herrera, however. For
instance, in dissenting from the per curiam reversal ordered in Dobbs v. Zant, Justice Scalia, joined
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in support of the habeas petition demonstrates the likely difficulty in
convincing any lower court of the need to actually hold an evidentiary
hearing to consider the credibility of the affiants. 192 Third, in deferring to
the power of executive clemency, the majority avoids implementation of
its general support for the proposition that the Constitution precludes
execution of an innocent defendant by relying on the politically flimsy
prospects for executive intervention in the most inflammatory criminal
prosecutions.
Moreover, the Court's treatment of Herrera's theoretical bases for
relief is equally troubling in light of two distinct trends in constitutional
jurisprudence. First, as Justice Blackmun noted in dissent, the issue of
actual innocence has already been intertwined with federal habeas juris-
diction over the past several terms. 93 For example, in both McCleskey v.
Zant 94 and Sawyer v. Whitley'1 the Court held that a colorable allegation
of actual innocence would excuse the bar of writ abuse and justify
consideration of a successive petition on its merits. McCleskey involved
application of this exception in the context of a claim of pure factual
innocence, 196 while the Court in Sawyer applied a similar standard in the
context of a capital case where the evidence of actual innocence bears on
the suitability of the punishment imposed. 9 The exception to application
of the bar of abuse of the writ' 98 based on a showing of actual innocence
- the necessary showing to meet the standard of "fundamental miscarriage
of justice"' 99 - effectively recognizes the significance of a claim of
innocence within the federal system of protected rights.
by Justice Thomas, argued against remand for consideration of likelihood that error resulted from the
lower court's refusal to consider newly available portions of the trial record not previously included
in the record on appeal due to the prosecution's representation that this portion of the transcript was
unavailable. 113 S. Ct. 835, 836 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stressed, based upon his
review of the newly available portion of the transcript: "There is absolutely zero likelihood that
counsel's misrecollection (or misconstruction) that he had made an 'impulsiveness' argument to the
jury made the difference in the 1986 finding that his assistance was not ineffective." Id. at 837.
192. Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent that the district court might need to hold an
evidentiary hearing to consider the credibility of affiants presenting newly discovered, exculpatory
evidence, but that this would not require re-litigation of the entire trial. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 883.
193. Id. at 880-81 (Section II of the Blackmun dissent details recent reliance on actual innocence
to excuse procedural default and abuse of writ claims in federal habeas actions.). See generally Part
11 of this article, supra, discussing the evolving habeas jurisdiction on the issue of procedural default.
194. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). Avoidance of the bar imposed on a showing that the petitioner had
abused the writ may be predicated on satisfaction of the "cause and prejudice" standard now generally
imposed in habeas litigation. Id. at 1470-71. "Cause" for failure to raise claims in a timely fashion
may be demonstrated by showing that the state or its agents acted to deprive the petitioner of a fair
opportunity to litigate his claim, or when entitled to effective assistance of counsel, that the petitioner
was deprived of effective representation under the Sixth Amendment.
195. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
196. 111 S. Ct. at 1470 ("If petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the claim in an
earlier petition may nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of
justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim.").
197. 112 S. Ct. at 2520 ("The phrase 'innocent of death' is not a natural usage of those words,
but we must strive to construct an analog to the simpler situation represented by the case of a non
capital defendant.").
198. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1963) (once government pleads abuse of
the writ upon filing of successor habeas petition, burden shifts to petitioner to show that he has not
abused the writ in seeking relief).
199. McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470. The Court observed that a "narrow class of cases" will
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To reject actual innocence itself as a basis for relief while recognizing
it as the source of the exception to the bar of abuse of the writ would
effectively suggest that form, rather than substance, is of paramount
importance in habeas litigation. 2°° Of course, this is not an accurate view,
since the innocence of the accused would serve only to support a higher
degree of demonstrable prejudice for relief in the instance of a successor
petition than that applicable when a claim of federal constitutional violation
is addressed on direct appeal or in an initial application for federal habeas
relief. Effectively, the "actual innocence" exception to application of the
abuse of the writ bar serves to elevate the degree of harmfulness which
must be demonstrated in order for reversal or vacation of the conviction
to be warranted. Nevertheless, the superficial impression would almost
necessarily be difficult to rebut: that claims of innocence are less merito-
rious in the eyes of the Court than claims of "technical" violations of the
rights of an accused.
Second, it is not altogether clear that Townsend should have been
relied on as a general bar to preclude review of claims of innocence
standing alone2° 1 in light of the Court's traditional concern for innocence
as a problem of due process. For example, the imposition of a constitu-
tionally mandated standard of proof in criminal actions in In re Winship 2
and Jackson v. Virginia;20 1 the application of the double jeopardy bar in
cases of reversal based upon insufficient evidence which require acquittal
in Greene v. Massey2°4 and in certain death penalty cases to jury-imposed
life sentences, Bullington v. Missouri;2 5 and the concern over improper
shifting of the burden of proof or relaxation of the prosecution's burden
in Sandstrom v. Montana2°6 and Mullaney v. Wilbur2° all serve to suggest
the fundamental importance of wrongful conviction of the innocent as an
element of concern in the Court's interpretation of the guarantees of the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, the Court's decision in United States v. Williams,208 suggests
the limits of the current Court's interest in innocence as an independent
support habeas review despite procedural default, namely, "extraordinary instances when a constitutional
violation probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime." This situation qualifies
for the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception earlier noted in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 495 (1986).
200. In discussing the role of actual innocence as a basis for avoiding procedural bar and abuse
of writ defenses, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted for the majority: "This is not to say that our habeas
jurisprudence casts a blind eye towards innocence." Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
201. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860 ("This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts
sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors
of fact.").
202. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
203. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The Herrera majority observed that Jackson "comes as close to
authorizing evidentiary review of a state court conviction on federal habeas as any of our cases."
Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861.
204. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
205. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
206. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
207. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
208. 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1740 n.4 (1992).
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proposition for federal review. The Court in Williams rejected a Tenth
Circuit rule resting on case law which permitted dismissal of an indictment
returned by a grand jury who had not been presented with exculpatory
evidence in the government's possession. The Court couched its reversal
of the Tenth Circuit position on a distinction drawn between the authority
of courts to fashion supervisory rules over conduct of litigation and the
traditional autonomy of the grand jury in holding that imposition of a
supervisory rule over action before the grand jury was not proper. Thus,
the question of the accused's innocence was effectively subordinated to
the Court's concern for an orderly, non-activist posture on the part of the
judiciary.
Finally, the Court's treatment of Herrera is particularly distressful for
capital defense counsel because of its reluctance to stay the execution in
order to permit full litigation of the case. Although four justices voted to
grant certiorari in the case,210 no order for stay. of execution of Herrera's
death sentence was entered."' The fact that a capital case might both merit
review but not warrant a stay of execution is not unique in the Court's
death penalty habeas corpus history. 2 2 For instance, in Hamilton v. Texas213
four members of the Court voted to grant review in a capital case, but
the capital defendant was executed before the case could be heard due to
the lack of a fifth vote to stay the inmate's execution. Justices Marshall214
and Stevens, 215 joined by Justice Blackmun in each instance, filed special
concurring opinions to the ultimate denial of the certiorari application
after the inmate's execution, criticizing the Court's disposition of the
case.
216
The absence of a fifth vote to stay the execution in Herrera suggests
nothing less than the willingness of the Court to elevate deference to the
state's interest in execution above full litigation of the federal claim. 217
209. Id. at 1741-42.
210. 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992) (No. A-604).
211. Herrera v. Texas, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992) (No. 91-7146). See Herrera v. Collins, 112 S. Ct.
1074 (1992) (No. A-604), denying application for stay of execution presented to Justice Scalia and
then referred by him to the Court. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter indicated that
they would grant the application for the stay. Id. In fact, in Cause No. 91-7328, the cert petition was
granted with the notation: "The order of this date denying the application for stay of execution of
sentence is to remain in effect." 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992) (No. 91-7328).
212. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 912-16 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting and criticizing
the Court's endorsement of expedited procedures for disposing of habeas claims in capital cases).
213. 497 U.S. 1016, 1017-20 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay).
214. 111 S. Ct. 281 (1990).
215. Id. at 282.
216. See Id. at 282 (Marshall, J., documenting the change in Court policy from customarily
providing fifth vote for stay where "Rule of Four" results in grant of review, quoting Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of stay in Straight v. Wainwright, 476 U.S. 1132, 1134-35 (1986), to ensure
disposition prior to execution).
217. Herrera's execution was ultimately stayed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals with a
majority of that court noting the perverse consequence of the failure of the Supreme Court to stay a
petitioner's execution after agreeing to hear the case. Ex parte Herrera, 828 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992). The majority suggested that a "rule of five" would prevent the situation from reoccurring.
Id.
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This lack of stay is particularly troubling in light of the fact that a majority
of the Court ultimately would have concluded that had Herrera met the
threshold evidentiary requirement for federal relief, he would have been
entitled to that relief. 218
Finally, the court's disposition leaves intact the apparent prerogative
of the states to preclude effective judicial remedies for newly discovered
evidence establishing the innocence of the accused by imposing jurisdic-
tional periods of limitation for presentation of such claims. 2 9 The majority
opinion discusses at length the remedy afforded by many jurisdictions in
providing for the filing of motions for new trial, including those asserting
newly discovered evidence. 220 Nevertheless, the majority refused to hold
"that Texas' refusal to entertain petitioner's newly discovered evidence
eight years after his conviction transgresses a principle of fundamental
fairness 'rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.' ' 22' Instead,
the majority simply turned to the alternative remedy of executive clemency
to afford relief for Herrera's claim.
Thus, the Court not only failed to expressly hold that federal habeas
jurisdiction lies to consider factually sufficient claims of actual innocence,
it failed to impose upon the states any constitutional duty to provide a
forum for the litigation of these claims. The net result of the majority's
failure to confront the actual innocence issue directly will eventually be to
facilitate, rather than retard, the execution of a factually innocent capital
defendant.2 22 For proponents of capital punishment, the long term effect
of failing to maintain standards for ultimate reliability in the judgement
and sentencing decisions may well be reversal of public sentiment sup-
porting the death penalty. For opponents and capital defense counsel
Herrera represents yet another failed vehicle for assuring that public and
prosecutorial support for the death penalty will not result in an erroneous
exercise of that power.
CONCLUSION
Proponents of "reform" of federal habeas corpus have succeeded,
primarily within the Supreme Court, in streamlining the federal remedy at
the expense of access to federal district courts for state inmates. Signifi-
cantly, much of the streamlining has occurred through implementation of
218. Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter dissented. Justices White and O'Connor concurred,
with Justice Kennedy joining the latter concurrence. Upon a proper evidentiary showing, these six
justices indicated their intent to find that a claim of actual innocence is cognizable in federal habeas
corpus to prevent the execution of an innocent state defendant.
219. 113 S. Ct. at 865-66 nn.8-11 (noting that only nine states do not impose time limits on
assertion of newly discovered evidence based motions for new trial, with other jurisdictions imposing
time limits ranging from 60 days to three years).
220. Id. at 864-65. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in opening his discussion of the new trial
remedy that the "Constitution itself, of course, makes no mention of new trials." Id. at 864.
221. Id. at 866 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
222. In fact, Justice Blackmun noted recent studies concluding that innocent capital defendants
have already been executed. 113 S. Ct. at 876 n.1 (citing Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. RaV. 21, 36, 173-79 (1987) and
MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE, 282-356 (1993)).
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facially reasonable limitations on litigation, such as the requirement that
inmates present exhausted federal claims in a single petition seeking relief
from state convictions.
However, the policy of strict deference to state application of rules
of procedural default, reflected in the Court's decisions in Murray v.
Carrier223 and Coleman v. Thompson, 22 clearly means that many colorable
claims of federal constitutional rights violations will never be heard on
their merits by either state or federal courts due to inadequacies in the
performance of counsel. Further, state courts which have declined to bar
claims procedurally in the past are now advised most clearly that the
application of default principles will end litigation quickly and without
federal intervention in the state court judgment, a realization which can
only serve to discourage consideration of claims of even egregious impro-
prieties.
Moreover, the Court's decisions which have limited the federal right
to counsel through trial and direct appeal, even in capital cases in which
the death penalty has been imposed, create serious problems for those
state inmates who must negotiate the maze of harmless error and procedural
default without guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.
The 1992 term of the Court includes significant potential threats to
the continuing vitality of federal habeas corpus. Already, the Court has
limited the discretion of federal appellate courts to address issues of
importance on the merits, 22 and further limitation on the power of the
federal judiciary to correct errors of constitutional magnitude made by
state trial courts in criminal prosecutions 26 threatens the balance between
enforcement of these rights by state and federal courts which the Court
purportedly sought to implement with its decision in Michigan v. Long.
Instead, the Court's brinkmanship in habeas litigation, particularly
exemplified by the denial of a stay of execution sought in Herrera v.
Texas, demonstrates a "reform" movement within the Court which com-
promises enforcement of federal rights in state criminal trials and focuses
on technical procedural flaws in lieu of addressing essential questions of
innocence and substantial violations of federally protected basic rights.
The ultimate costs to innocent and aggrieved litigants, counsel litigating in
good faith, and the reliability and fairness of the criminal justice system
cannot be ignored without subjecting the administration of justice to long
223. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
224. Il S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
225. See Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (dissolving stay of
execution granted to consider state death row inmate's claim that California method of execution, gas
chamber, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, on grounds that untimely assertion of claim in
fifth federal habeas petition constituted abuse of writ); Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713, 1714
(1992) ("No further stays of Robert Alton Harris' execution shall be entered by the federal courts
except upon order of this Court.").
226. See, e.g., Griffin v. Delo, 961 F.2d 793 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 296 (1992) (Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded case for consideration of merits of constitutional claims not
represented in state and federal habeas proceedings due to counsel's apparent failure to recognize
claims in state death penalty case).
1992]
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term loss of confidence within the bar, the public, the prisons227 - of
course - and state and federal trial and appellate courts.
227. The U.S. prison population constitutes a significant under-represented client base with thirty
nine state prisons and the D.C. prison system now operating pursuant to federal court orders or
consent decrees, in part as a result of substantial overcrowding. See Sharon LaFraniere, Seeing No
Evil, Fearing No Evil: And yet, in overcrowded prisons, much evil is done, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY.
ED. March 9-15, 1992, at 31.
